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ABSTRACT
A key challenge in censorship circumvention is being able to direct legitimate
users to redirection proxies while preventing censors, posing as insiders, from
discovering their addresses and blocking them. In this thesis, we study how to
protect and/or design censorship circumvention systems to resist the insider
attacks.
Tor is one of the most popular censorship circumvention systems; it uses
bridges run by volunteers as proxies to evade censorship. We propose rBridge{
a user reputation system for bridge distribution; it assigns bridges according
to the past history of users to limit corrupt users from repeatedly blocking
bridges, and employs an introduction-based mechanism to invite new users
while resisting Sybil attacks. Our evaluation results show that rBridge pro-
vides much stronger protection for bridges than any existing scheme. We also
address another important challenge to the bridge distribution|preserving
the privacy of users' bridge assignment information, which can be exploited
by malicious parties to degrade users' anonymity in anonymous communica-
tion.
We propose a new framework for censorship-resistant web browsing called
CensorSpoofer that addresses this challenge by exploiting the asymmetric na-
ture of web browsing trac and making use of IP spoong. CensorSpoofer de-
couples the upstream and downstream channels, using a low-bandwidth indi-
rect channel for delivering outbound requests (URLs) and a high-bandwidth
direct channel for downloading web content. The upstream channel hides
the request contents using steganographic encoding within Email or instant
messages, whereas the downstream channel uses IP address spoong so that
the real address of the proxies is not revealed either to legitimate users or
censors. We built a proof-of-concept prototype that uses encrypted VoIP
for this downstream channel and demonstrated the feasibility of using the
CensorSpoofer framework in a realistic environment.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Today, the Internet is playing an ever-increasing role in social and political
movements around the world. Activists use it to coordinate their activities
and to inform the general people of important information that is not avail-
able via traditional media channels. The role played by Twitter, Facebook,
YouTube, CNN iReport and many other websites/blogs in the recent events
in the Middle East is a great example of this [1, 2].
The free ow of information and exchange of ideas on the Internet has
been perceived as a serious threat by repressive regimes. In response, they
have imposed strong censorship on the Internet usage of their citizens. They
monitor, lter, trace, and block data ows using sophisticated technologies,
such as IP address blocking, DNS hijacking, and deep packet inspection [3,4].
For example, the \Great Firewall of China" blocks almost all popular social
networks, such as Facebook, Twitter and Flickr, and other websites that
may provide political information contrary to the state's agenda, such as
Youtube, Wikipedia, BBC News, and CNN [5]. To exercise control over the
Internet, the Chinese government employs an Internet police force of over
30 000 people to constantly monitor the citizens' online activities [6], and an
individual who is caught violating the laws of Chinese censorship is subject
to payment of nes [7].
A typical approach to skirting censorship is to deploy circumvention proxies
outside the censored network, which can provide indirect access to blocked
websites [8{11]. For example, Tor [11] is one of the most popular proxy-based
circumvention systems; it uses bridges run by volunteers as proxies to evade
censorship. Censors are, however, eager to discover such bridges and block
them as well. A particularly powerful approach to enumerating bridges is the
insider attack, wherein the censor colludes with corrupt users to discover and
shut down bridges; the censor can further amplify the attack by deploying a
large number of Sybils to accelerate the discovery of bridges.
1
There are four desirable properties on a censorship circumvention system.
Firstly, it should require no special support from the network infrastructure.
For instance, some designs [16{18] assume that certain special routers can
be deployed by core ISPs on backbone Internet, which might not be real-
istic in practice. Secondly, it should require no special server, which could
easily be blocked by censors due to their small quantity. For example, some
circumvention circumvention systems rely on oversea Email servers that sup-
port encryption; however, only Gmail and hotmail meet the requirements.
Thirdly, it should be able to support web browsing, while some circumven-
tion systems [42{46] are not designed to support low latency communication.
Lastly, it should provide strong resistance against the insider attack. The hy-
pothesis statement of this thesis is as follows:
\It is possible to build a censorship circumvention system that does not re-
quire special server or special support from the network infrastructure, and
that provides web browsing and strong resistance to the insider attack."
1.1 Contribution
Reputation based bridge distribution. Our rst contribution is to pro-
pose rBridge [12]|a user reputation system for Tor bridge distribution in
order to improve the robustness of Tor bridges against the insider attack.
rBridge computes users' reputation based on the uptime of their assigned
bridges, and allows a user to replace a blocked bridge by paying a certain
amount of reputation credits; this prevents corrupt users from repeatedly
blocking bridges. In addition, high-reputation users are granted opportu-
nities to invite friends into the system. The introduction-based approach
ensures the system can steadily grow the user base as recruiting new bridges,
while preventing adversaries from inserting a large number of corrupt users
or Sybils into the system. We performed extensive evaluation to show that
rBridge provides much stronger protection for bridges than any existing
scheme; for instance, the number of user-hours served by bridges in rBridge is
at least one order of magnitude more than that of the state-of-the-art proxy
distribution scheme [13].
Privacy-preserving bridge distribution. Our second contribution is
to design a privacy-preserving user reputation system for Tor bridge distribu-
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tion, i.e, privacy-preserving rBridge [12]. The key in ensuring user anonymity
in Tor is to preserve the information about each user's selection of relays (in-
cluding bridges) in building anonymous circuits. To achieve so, the bridge
assignment information of each user must be kept secret from any parties,
including the bridge distributor. Therefore, in order to ensure anonymity
in rBridge, the bridge related information on users' reputation proles must
be managed by the users themselves to avoid leaking the information to
the bridge distributor. This raises the problem that malicious users could
cheat the reputation system by manipulating their records. In this thesis,
we propose a novel privacy-preserving user reputation scheme for bridge dis-
tribution, which can not only ensure the bridge distributor learns nothing
about users' bridge assignment, but also prevent corrupt users from cheat-
ing. To our best knowledge, rBridge is the rst scheme that is able to per-
fectly preserve users' privacy in bridge distribution. We implemented the
privacy-preserving scheme, and experimental results show that rBridge has
reasonable performance.
Proxy distribution strategies by limiting the amount of information each
user gets and trying to identify compromised insiders (such as rBridge and
some existing schemes [13{15]) can partially mitigate the insider attack, be-
cause some of the proxies can still be blocked (although the proxy consump-
tion is fairly low for rBridge) and the system operator needs to keep adding
new proxies to replace blocked ones. The key issue in proxy based circumven-
tion systems is that proxies' addresses are potentially revealed to malicious
users and thus are blockable. An alternate approach is to never reveal the
proxies' address to legitimate users and thus be completely immune to the
insider attack. Some recent work suggests strategically placing special de-
ection routers at core Internet ISPs to transparently redirect users' trac
to the proxies [16{18]. Such a deployment, however requires a signicant
resource investment that is likely to come only from a (pro-Internet freedom)
government agency, as well as cooperation of large ISPs.
A new censorship circumvention architecture. Our third contri-
bution is to propose a new censorship circumvention architecture, Censor-
Spoofer [19], that can be deployed using minimal resources, perhaps volun-
teered by ordinary people interested in promoting Internet freedom. (The
Tor project [11] has demonstrated the feasibility of building a successful ser-
vice with contributions from such volunteers.) Our key insight is that it is
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possible to use IP address spoong to send data from the proxy to a user
without revealing its actual origin. Such a spoofed channel allows communi-
cation in a single direction only; however, we can exploit the asymmetric na-
ture of web-browsing trac, using a low-bandwidth indirect channel, such as
steganographic instant messages or Email, to communicate requests from the
user to the proxy. To avoid identication by the censor, CensorSpoofer mim-
ics an encrypted VoIP session to tunnel the downstream data, since the VoIP
protocol does not require endpoints to maintain close synchronization and
does not reveal its contents to the censor. We also explore additional steps
that need to be taken to prevent detection; namely, choosing a plausible fake
IP source address. To demonstrate the feasibility of CensorSpoofer, we built
a proof-of-concept prototype implementation and tested it in a real-world
environment. Our experiments show that our prototype can be successfully
used for browsing the web while resisting blocking eorts of the censors.
1.2 Roadmap
We present the motivation, design, and evaluation of rBridge { a user repu-
tation based Tor bridge distribution strategy in Chapter 2, and elaborate the
cryptographic construction and evaluation of a privacy-preserving version of
rBridge in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 describes a new censorship circumvention
architecture, CensorSpoofer, as well as its prototype implementation and
evaluation. We nally summarize the thesis research and discuss learned
lessons in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 2
A USER REPUTATION BASED
APPROACH TO SECURING TOR BRIDGE
DISTRIBUTION
Tor [11] is a popular anonymity system aiming to provide low-latency anony-
mous communication for a large scale of users. In Tor, each user uses three
randomly selected relays to build an onion encryption tunnel in order to
communicate with a remote host (e.g., a website) anonymously. As of May
4 2012, there are about 3 000 relays in the Tor network and over 500 000
directly connecting users daily [20].
Recently, Tor has been increasingly used as a censorship circumvention
tool. Users in a censored country can use Tor relays as proxies to access
blocked sites. However, since all of the Tor relays are publicly listed, many
countries (e.g., China) have blocked the public Tor relays altogether. In
response, Tor turned to private relays run by volunteers, called bridges, to
circumvent censorship. A key challenge though is to distribute the addresses
of bridges to a large number of users without exposing them to the censor.
So far, Tor has tried four dierent distribution strategies. First, each user
can receive a small subset of bridges based on their IP address as well as the
current time. Second, a small subset can be obtained by sending a request via
GMail. These strategies fail to protect against an adversary who has access
to a large number of IP addresses and GMail accounts; Chinese censors were
able to enumerate all bridges in under a month [21]. (McLachlan and Hopper
further showed that open proxies could be used to gain access to a large
number of IP addresses [22]). The third strategy involves distributing bridge
addresses to a few trusted people in censored countries in an ad hoc manner,
who then disseminate this information to their social networks. Fourth, an
individual can deploy a private bridge and give the bridge's address only to
trusted contacts. These methods can resist bridge discovery but reach only
a limited fraction of the population of potential bridge users.
We propose rBridge [12]|a user reputation system for bridge distribution;
it assigns bridges according to the past history of users to limit corrupt
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users from repeatedly blocking bridges, and employs an introduction-based
mechanism to invite new users while resisting Sybil attacks. As we shall
show that, rBridge provides much stronger protection for bridges than any
existing scheme.
2.1 Related Work on Proxy Distribution
Researchers have tried to design better proxy distribution strategies [13{
15, 23]. Feamster et al. [23] proposed a keyspace-hopping mechanism for
proxy distribution, which employs computational puzzles to prevent a corrupt
user from learning a large number of proxies. However, this mechanism is
not likely to withstand an adversary who has strong computational power;
the results of [23] show that 95% of 100 000 proxies would be discovered
if the adversary can solve about 300 000 puzzles. In the scheme proposed
by Sovran et al. [15], the address of a proxy is given to a few highly trusted
people who play as internal proxies to relay other users' trac to the external
proxy; the addresses of these forwarders are advertised by performing random
walks on social networks. However, this scheme is unable to provide users
reliable circumvention service as forwarders may go oine from time to time;
besides, the forwarders (residing in the censored country) could receive a
severe penalty for facilitating circumvention, which may make people hesitate
to serve as forwarders.
Mahdian [14] studied the proxy distribution problem from an algorithmic
point of view, and theoretically analyzed the lower bound of the number of
proxies required to survive a certain number of malicious insiders. Neverthe-
less, their scheme is not practical, as it assumes that the number of corrupt
users is known in advance and there is no limit on the capacity of each proxy.
Recently, McCoy et al. [13] proposed Proximax, which leverages social net-
works for proxy distribution and distributes proxies based on the eciency of
each distribution channel to maximize the overall usage of all proxies. In this
work, we explicitly compare rBridge with Proximax and show that rBridge
is able to provide much stronger protection for bridges than Proximax.
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2.2 Concept
We now present the design goals, threat model, and scope of rBridge.
2.2.1 Goals
rBridge aims to achieve the following goals:
1. Maximized user-hours of bridges: McCoy et al. [13] proposed the metric
user-hours to evaluate the robustness of a proxy distribution strategy.
It represents the sum of hours that a bridge can serve for all of its users
before being blocked.
2. Minimized thirsty-hours of users: Another important aspect, which is
overlooked by prior work, is thirstiness of honest users. We use thirsty-
hours to measure the time that an honest user has no bridge to use.
We aim to minimize it to ensure high quality of service.
3. Healthy growth of the user base: We assume the bridge distributor can
recruit new bridges from time to time, and each bridge can support up
to a certain number of users due to limited capacity. The consump-
tion of bridges is due to either new user joining or bridge blocking. By
\healthy growth of the user base", we mean the user base can grow
correspondingly as new bridges are added to the system, without caus-
ing thirstiness of existing users. For an ineective bridge distribution
strategy, corrupt users can drain out the bridge resource, leaving little
ability to grow the user base.
4. Privacy preservation of bridge assignment: We aim to prevent any en-
tity (e.g., a curious bridge distributor) from learning any information
about bridge assignment of a particular user; such information can be
exploited to degrade the user's anonymity. (This property is to be
achieved in the cryptographic version of rBridge presented in Chap-
ter 3.)
We note that 4) distinguishes rBridge from prior work, as none of the
existing approaches preserves users' bridge assignment information. For 1),
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2), and 3), we shall show that rBridge can achieve much higher performance
than any existing approach.
It is important to note that similar to prior work, we are not interested in
ensuring a single or a few important individuals can access unblocked bridges.
Instead, we aim to provide the circumvention service to the majority of
users; in other words, it is possible that a few honest users could lose all their
bridges before boosting their reputation to receive new bridges. Providing
guaranteed circumvention service to a few special users can be easily achieved
by deploying a few exclusive circumvention proxies; however, we believe it
is more valuable to provide the circumvention service to a large number of
ordinary users.
2.2.2 Threat Model
We consider a state-level adversary (i.e., the censor), who has access to rich
human resource, i.e., controlling a substantial number of potential bridge
users. In rBridge, a new user needs an invitation ticket (which is probabilis-
tically distributed to high-reputation users) to register and join the system.
A registered malicious user can block his assigned bridges by revealing them
to the censor who can later block the bridges (referred to as the insider at-
tack). Typically, the censor would like to block as many bridges as quickly as
possible, but in some instances she can adopt other strategies, such as keep-
ing known bridges unblocked for some period of time to boost the number
of insiders and later performing a massive blocking attempt in a crisis. In
general, we assume the set of malicious users is a Byzantine adversary, and
can deviate from the protocol in arbitrary ways to maximize their chance of
blocking bridges. The adversary could also launch the Sybil attack by cre-
ating a large number of fake accounts in the population of potential bridge
users. We note that, however, the Sybils can help the adversary discover
bridges only if they can get registered. In addition, we assume that the ad-
versary can access substantial network resources, e.g., a large number of IP
addresses and Email accounts, but she has bounded computational power
and is unable to subvert widely used cryptographic systems.
Unlike the existing schemes [13{15,21, 23] that assume the bridge distrib-
utor is fully trusted, we consider an honest-but-curious model for the bridge
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distributor, which is within the threat model of Tor [11]. More specically,
we assume the bridge distributor honestly follows the protocol, but is inter-
ested in learning any private information about users, such as which bridges
are assigned to a particular user. For ease of presentation, we assume there
is a single bridge distributor, but it is straightforward to duplicate the bridge
distributor by creating multiple mirrored servers.
2.2.3 Scope
For clarity, we do not attempt to address network-level bridge discovery. We
assume the censor is able to learn bridges only from the distribution channels
(i.e., based on the knowledge of registered corrupt users and Sybils). It is
possible that the censor employs other techniques to discover bridges. For
instance, the censor could try to probe all IP addresses on the Internet to
nd hosts that run Tor handshake protocols, ngerprint Tor trac to identify
bridges, or monitor the users who connect to a discovered bridge to see what
other TLS connections these users establish and try to further verify whether
the connected hosts are bridges [21]. We note that if the censor were able
to identify bridges using such network-level bridge discovery techniques, any
bridge distribution strategy would not be able to work. Defending against
such attacks is an active research area; researchers have been proposing var-
ious defense mechanisms, such as obfsproxy [24], BridgeSPA [25], and client
password authorization [26]. We acknowledge that eective mechanisms for
resisting the network-level bridge discovery are important research problems,
but they are orthogonal to this work.
In rBridge, users' reputation is calculated based on the uptime of their
assigned bridges, which requires a mechanism to test reachability of bridges
from censored countries. Recently, the Tor project has proposed several
methods to accurately test bridges' availability [27], and we expect these
mechanisms to be deployed soon. To clarify, we assume the availability in-
formation of bridges can be provided by the Tor network, and how to reliably
check the bridges' reachability is out of the scope of this work.
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2.3 The Basic rBridge Scheme
The openness of a proxy-based censorship circumvention system and its ro-
bustness to the insider attack seem to be in conict. On the one hand,
allowing anyone to join the system and get bridges allows malicious users
to quickly enumerate all of the bridges [21]. On the other hand, applying
highly stringent restrictions on user registration and bridge distribution (e.g.,
giving bridges only to highly trusted people using social networks) enhances
robustness, but makes it hard for the majority of potential bridge users to
get bridges.
Our key insight is that it is possible to bridge the gap between the openness
and robustness of bridge distribution by building a user reputation system.
Instead of trying to keep all malicious users outside the system, we adopt a
less restrictive user invitation mechanism to ensure the bridge distribution
can reach a large number of potential users; in particular, we use a loosely
trusted social network for user invitation, and a well-behaving user can in-
vite his less close friends into the system. Meanwhile, we leverage a user
reputation system to punish blockers and limit them from repeatedly block-
ing bridges; more specically, each user earns credits based on the uptime
of his bridges, needs to pay credits to get a new bridge, and is provided op-
portunities to invite new users only if his credit balance is above a certain
threshold.
It is important to note that our goal is not to keep bridges unblocked
forever; instead, we try to achieve a more practical goal|having bridges
serve a suciently long period of time so that the overall rate of recruiting
new bridges outpaces the rate of losing bridges. We also note that this is
still a very challenging problem; as will be shown by the comparison results
(Section 2.5), the existing schemes have a dicult time protecting bridges
from being blocked even for a very limited period of time.
2.3.1 Joining the System
When joining the system, a new user U receives k bridges B1;    ; Bk as well
as a credential, which is used to verify U as a legitimate registered user. The
credential is signed by the bridge distributor D and includes the following
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information:
UkkfBi; i; igki=1
wherein  denotes the total credits owned by U, i denotes the time when
Bi is given to U, and i denotes the credits that U has earned from Bi. (At
the initialization,  = 0, i = 0, and i is the joining time). The selection of
the bridges B1;    ; Bk is at random. D keeps counting the number of users
assigned to each bridge and stops giving a bridge's address to new users once
the number of users assigned to the bridge reaches an upper limit (denoted
by g).
2.3.2 Earning Credits
U is given credits based on the uptime of his bridges. The credit assignment
policy should have the following properties. First, it should provide incentives
for corrupt users to keep the bridge alive for at least a certain period of
time, say T0 days, which should be long enough to make sure enough new
bridges can be recruited in time to maintain the overall bridge resources in
the system. Second, the total credits that a user earns from a bridge should
be upper-bounded, to prevent corrupt users from keeping one bridge alive to
continuously earn credits and using the earned credits to request and block
other bridges.
Now, we dene the credit assignment function Credit(). Let Tcur denote
the current time, and i denote the time when Bi gets blocked (if Bi is not
blocked yet, i =1). We dene t as the length of the time period from the
time when U knows Bi to the time when Bi gets blocked or the current time
if Bi is not blocked, i.e., t = minfi; Tcurg   i. We let  denote the rate of
earning credits from a bridge (credits/day) and T1 denote the upper-bound
time by which U can earn credits from the bridge. Then, the amount of
credits i earned from Bi is dened as:
i = Credit(t) =
8><>:
0 t < T0
(t  T0)   T0  t  T1
(T1   T0)   t > T1
Without loss of generality, we dene  = 1 credit/day; then, the maximum
credits that a user can earn from a bridge are (T1   T0).
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From time to time (e.g., before requesting a new bridge), U requests D to
update his credit balance  with his recently earned credits, say, from Bi.
D rst validates U's credential (verifying the tagged signature), and then re-
calculates the credits ~i according to the uptime of Bi, adds the dierence
~i   i to , updates i with ~i, and nally re-signs the updated credential.
2.3.3 Getting a New Bridge
To limit the number of bridges that a corrupt user knows, we allow each user
to have k or fewer alive bridges at any time. This is enforced by granting a
new bridge to a user U only if one of his bridges (say Bb) has been blocked.
In particular, upon a request for a new bridge in replace of Bb, D rst veries
that Bb is in U's credential and has been blocked. D also checks whether U
has enough credits to pay for a new bridge, i.e.,  >  , where   is the
price for a new bridge.
After giving out a new bridge ~Bb, D updates U's credential by replacing
the record fBb; b; bg with f ~Bb; Tcur; 0g and updating the total credits with
~ =   . To prevent a malicious user from re-using his old credentials that
has more credits, D keeps a list of expired credentials (e.g., storing the hash
value of the credential); once U's credential is updated, the old credential is
added to the expired credential list and cannot be used again.
We note that temporarily blocking a bridge just to create an open spot
for a new bridge does not help a corrupt user, because he still needs to pay
the same amount of credits to get a new bridge and the availability loss of
a temporarily blocked bridge is strictly smaller than that of a permanently
blocked bridge.
2.3.4 Inviting New Users
D periodically sends out invitation tickets to high-reputation users whose
credit balances are higher than the threshold . Since the censor may let
some corrupt users behave legitimately to simply accumulate credits and
obtain invitation tickets in order to deploy more corrupt users or Sybils in
the system, we let D randomly select the recipients of invitation tickets from
qualied users. A user who has received an invitation ticket can give it to
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any of his friends, who can later use the ticket to join the system.
Note that the system needs to reserve a certain fraction (e.g., 50%) of
bridge resource (i.e., the sum of the remaining capacity of unblocked bridges)
for potential replacement of blocked bridges for existing users, while using the
rest bridge resource to invite new users. The amount of reserved resource can
be dynamically adjusted according to the amount of current bridge resource
and the plans for growing the user base and recruiting new bridges.
2.4 Discussion of Other Security Threats
2.4.1 Sybil Attacks
The adversary could launch Sybil attacks by creating a large number of Sybils
in the population of potential bridge users, so that the ratio f of compromised
entities in the potential users can be dramatically increased. However, we
note that deploying a large number of Sybils does not necessarily lead to
increase in corrupt users in the system. For honest users, their invitation
tickets are given to people they know. While corrupt users give all their
received tickets to colluding entities, the number of malicious entities they can
invite is bottlenecked by the number of invitation tickets they have received,
rather than by the number of malicious entities the adversary can create in
the population of potential users.
Alternatively, the adversary could try to deploy Sybils directly in the sys-
tem, which requires the adversary to provide each Sybil with a valid cre-
dential; however, this is infeasible without knowing the bridge distributor's
private key. We also note that it is infeasible to let corrupt users share their
credentials with the Sybils either, because the bridge distributor recycles
used credentials and the total number of bridges that can be learnt by the
adversary does not increase.
2.4.2 Blocking the Bridge Distributor
We suppose the IP address of the bridge distributor is publicly known.
Hence, the censor could simply block the bridge distributor to either pre-
vent new users from joining the system or stop existing users from receiving
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new bridges. For an existing user who has at least one unblocked bridge, he
can use the bridge to build a Tor circuit to access the bridge distributor. For
a user without any usable bridge (e.g., a new user), he can use a high-latency
but more robust circumvention tool (e.g., Email based circumvention [28])
to communicate with the bridge distributor to get the initial bridges or a re-
placement bridge. Besides, a new user could ask his inviter (i.e., the existing
user who gave him the invitation ticket) to perform the initial bootstrapping
on his behalf to get the initial bridges.
2.4.3 Well Behaving of Corrupt Users
In order to increase the number of corrupt users in the system, the adversary
could let the corrupt users behave legitimately (i.e., keeping their bridges
alive) for a certain period of time to accumulate credits in order to receive
invitation tickets. However, we note that since the invitation tickets are
randomly distributed to qualied users, corrupt users may not necessarily
receive invitation tickets even if they have saved up sucient credits. In
addition, keeping bridges alive also allows honest users to accumulate enough
credits to become qualied to receive invitation tickets; therefore, overall, the
chance of receiving invitation tickets by corrupt users is no better than that of
honest users. Our simulation results in Section 2.5 (where the corrupt users
do not block bridges until the 225-th day) show that this attack strategy
cannot help the adversary increase of ratio of corrupt users in the system.
In addition, rBridge does not allow users to transfer credits to others, and
hence it is infeasible to deploy a few well-behaving corrupt users to help other
corrupt users by sharing their credits.
2.5 Evaluation and Comparison
We now analyze the robustness of rBridge against the following blocking
strategies, and compare it with Proximax [13]. We discuss other potential
attacks in Section 2.4.
 Aggressive blocking: The censor is eager to block discovered bridges,
i.e., shutting down the bridge once it is known to a corrupt user.
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 Conservative blocking: A sophisticated censor may keep some bridges
alive for a certain period of time to accumulate credits, and use the
credits to discover new bridges and/or invite more corrupt users.
 Event-driven blocking: The censor may dramatically tighten the control
of the Internet access when certain events (e.g., crisis) take place. We
consider such attacks by assuming that malicious users do not block any
bridges until a certain time, when suddenly all the discovered bridges
get blocked.
To evaluate rBridge under these attacks, we implemented an event-based
simulator using a timing-based priority queue, by treating each state change
of the system as an event, such as inviting a new user, getting a new bridge,
blocking a bridge, recruiting a new bridge, etc. Each event contains a time
stamp indicating when the event occurs as well as an ID of the subject indi-
cating who will carry out the event. We start with choosing the parameters
for our simulation.
2.5.1 Parameter Selection
We employ probabilistic analysis to select appropriate parameters. To sim-
plify the parameter calculation, we consider a static user group (i.e., no new
users join the system); later, we validate our parameter selection in a dynamic
setting using the event-based simulator. In practice, the bridge distributor
can periodically re-calculate the parameters (e.g., every 30 days) using the
current size of the user group.
Initial setup. Let f denote the fraction of malicious users among all
potential bridge users (note that f is not the actual ratio of malicious users
in the system). We expect a typical value of f between 1% and 5%, but we
also evaluate rBridge with much higher f to see its robustness in extreme
cases. The system starts with N = 1000 users, which are randomly selected
from the pool of all potential bridge users; for instance, D could randomly
select a number of Chinese users on Twitter (based on their proles) as the
initial bridge users, and very likely these users are willing to use the bridge
based circumvention service because they already used some circumvention
tools to access Twitter (which is blocked in China).
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Figure 2.1: Number of initial bridges (N = 1000).
Each user is initially provided k = 3 bridges1. Suppose there are m0 initial
bridges in the system; the number of users per bridge is g0 =
N k
m0
on average.
Assuming a corrupt user blocks all of his bridges, the probability that an
honest user has no alive bridge is (1  (1  f)g0)k. According to Figure 2.1,
we choose m0 = 200 to make sure the majority of users can survive the initial
blocking.
g|the maximum number of users per bridge. In rBridge, when a
bridge gets blocked, all the g users sharing this bridge will be \punished"
(i.e., receive no more credits from the bridge and need to pay credits to get a
new bridge); intuitively, with a smaller g, it is easier to precisely punish the
real blocker, as fewer honest users would be punished by mistake. On the
other hand, we should make sure g is suciently large to avoid underusing
the bridges.
Here, we calculate the probability that a user has a certain number of
blocked bridges; this probability depends on g and determines the punish-
ment on the user. Let p denote the probability that a corrupt user blocks
a bridge he knows, and  denote the probability that a bridge is blocked.
Then, we have  = 1  (1  f  p)g (here we use f to approximate the ratio
of corrupt users in the system). We dene Xh (or Xm) as the number of
blocked bridges of an honest (or corrupt) user. Assuming a user obtains l
1In the current bridge distribution strategy deployed by Tor, each requesting user is
given 3 dierent bridges.
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Figure 2.2: Number of users per bridge (p is attack probability, f = 5%).
bridges since joining the system, we get:
Pr(Xh = x) =

l
x

 (1  )x  l x (2.1)
Pr(Xm = x) =

l   p  l
x  p  l

 (1  )x pll x (2.2)
We are interested in calculating Pr(Xm > Xh) |the probability that a
corrupt user has more blocked bridges than an honest user (i.e., the likelihood
that a corrupt user receives more punishment than an honest user); ideally,
this probability should be maximized. Pr(Xm > Xh) is calculated as:
Pr(Xm > Xh) =
lX
x=pl
Pr(Xm = x)
x 1X
y=0
Pr(Xh = y) (2.3)
Figure 2.2 depicts Pr(Xm > Xh) with l = 10 and f = 5%. While Pr(Xm >
Xh) is maximal when g is small, we choose a fairly large value g = 40 to make
sure bridges are not underutilized.
Credit(t)|the credit assignment function. Recall that T0 and T1 rep-
resent the expected lower and upper bounds of a bridge's life time, respec-
tively. We let Tlf denote the expected life time of a bridge, T0  Tlf  T1,
and s denote the speed of recruiting new bridges. To maintain the overall
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bridge resource, we should have:
Tlf  g  s  time = N  k  time (2.4)
From this, we get:
T0 =
N  k
g  smax ; T1 =
N  k
g  smin (2.5)
where smax and smin denote the maximum and minimum rate of recruiting
new bridges, respectively. (From May 2011 to May 2012, the Tor project
recruited about 400 new bridges [20].) In our evaluation, we set smax = 1
bridge/day and smin = 0:2 bridge/day, which implies that 70  360 bridges
need to be recruited per year. With N = 1000, we get T0 = 75 days and
T1 = 375 days according to (2.5). Note that with a larger number of users,
the overall bridge consumption will become higher and the system needs to
recruit more bridges. However, T0 and T1 we have calculated are the worst-
case expectations; as will be shown in the simulation, the lifetime of bridges
is actually much longer than the worst-case T0 and T1, and hence the pressure
of recruiting new bridges is smaller in practice.
 |the price for getting a new bridge. The credits earned from
unblocked bridges should be roughly equal to the credits paid to replace
blocked bridges. Therefore, approximately we have:
kX
x=0
Pr(Xh = x)  x    = (2.6)
kX
x=0
Pr(Xh = x)  (k   x)  (T1   T0)
From Equation (2.1) (2.6), we get   = 45.
|the threshold of credits for invitation. To decide the value of
, we assume that a user with at least half of his bridges unblocked can be
considered to invite new users. Then, we have:
 =
d k
2
eX
x=0
Pr(Xh = xjXh  dk
2
e)
(k   x)  (T1   T0) (2.7)
From Equation (2.1) (2.7), we get  = 236.
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Figure 2.3: Probability distribution of malicious users (f = 5%).
User invitation. In our simulation, we set the rate of recruiting new
bridges as s = 1 bridge/day; we reserve 50% of bridge resource for potential
replacement of blocked bridges. Every 7 days, the bridge distributor cal-
culates the number of new users to be invited based on the current bridge
resource, and distributes the corresponding number of invitation tickets to
randomly selected users whose credit balance is higher than .
Probability distribution of malicious users. Now we consider the
probability that an invited user is malicious. We suppose each corrupt user
always gives his invitation tickets to malicious users or Sybils. For an honest
user, if he randomly selects a new user to invite, the probability that the new
user is malicious is approximately f . However, in practice, a user is inclined
to rst invite the friends he trusts most; as receiving more and more invitation
tickets, the user will start to invite less trusted friends. To model this, we
assume each user ranks his friends based on trustworthiness: each friend is
assigned an index ranging from 0.0 to 1.0 according to the trustworthiness
(e.g., the most trusted one out of 100 friends has the index 1.0/100 = 0.01).
We consider two specic models to assign probabilities of malicious users.
One is staged distribution, wherein the friends are divided into two groups
(i.e., more trusted and less trusted) and all users within a group have the
same probability of being malicious. We assume 80% friends belong to the
\more trusted" group and the remaining 20% are in the \less trusted" group.
The other is linear distribution, for which the probability of being a malicious
user is a linear function of the index. We suppose the probability that the
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most trusted friend is malicious is 1%. For both distributions, the overall
ratio of malicious users is f . Figure 2.3 depicts the probability distributions
of these two models.
2.5.2 Evaluation Results
Using the event-based simulator, we measured the user-hours, thirsty-hours,
and growth of user base under dierent blocking strategies. We set the ratio
of malicious users in the potential user group as 5%.
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Figure 2.4: User-hours in aggressive blocking.
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Figure 2.5: % of thirsty-hours in aggressive blocking.
Aggressive blocking. We now present the simulation results for the
aggressive blocking. We can see from Figure 2.4 that when f = 5%, 80%
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Figure 2.6: User base in aggressive blocking.
of bridges can produce over 1000 user-hours, and 70% of bridges can serve
more than 10 000 user-hours, before being blocked; about 50% of bridges are
never blocked. Figure 2.5 shows that with f = 5%, over 95% of users are
never thirsty for bridges; a small fraction (about 2%) of users are unable to
get new bridges, because all of their initially assigned bridges get blocked
before they earn enough credits to request new bridges. Figure 2.6 shows
that users need some time (150  200 days) to accumulate enough credits
to become qualied for inviting friends. After the accumulation phase, the
user base starts to steadily grow almost linearly with the number of newly
recruited bridges. We also see that rBridge performs relatively better with
the staged distribution of malicious users than with the linear distribution;
this is because for the staged distribution most invited users belong to the
\more trusted" group, for which the probability of being a malicious user is
lower than that for the linear distribution.
In addition, we evaluate rBridge with a much higher f (using the same sys-
tem conguration). We can see that rBridge can easily tolerate 10% malicious
users; even when f = 30%, the performance of rBridge is still acceptable; for
f  50%, rBridge fails to provide reasonable protection for bridges.
Conservative blocking. There are two factors related to the conservative
blocking: the probability of blocking a bridge (p), and the waiting time to
block a bridge (wait). Since the time to earn credits from a bridge is upper-
bounded by T1, we assume a corrupt user always blocks his bridges by time
T1 (i.e., wait  T1). In the simulation, we consider the following cases for
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Figure 2.7: User-hours in conservative blocking.
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Figure 2.8: % of thirsty-hours in conservative blocking.
the waiting time: 0 day (i.e., aggressive blocking), 120 days (by which the
earned credits are sucient to get a new bridge), and 225 days (i.e., the
middle point between T0 and T1).
We can see from Figure 2.7, Figure 2.9, and Figure 2.8 that compared with
the aggressive blocking, the conservative blocking causes less damage to the
user-hours and the growth of user base; this is because the bridges under the
conservative blocking can serve a longer time and more users can accumulate
enough credits to invite new users. We also notice that when wait = 225 days
and p = 100%, about 10% of users are thirsty for 15% of their time, which is
worse than the aggressive blocking; the reason for this is that after waiting
225 days, malicious users earn enough credits to be considered for inviting
new (malicious) users (i.e., (225   75)  3 = 450 > 236), and overall they
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Figure 2.9: User base in conservative blocking.
can block more bridges, which causes more recently joined users to become
thirsty.
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Figure 2.10: Unblocked bridges in event-driven blocking.
Event-driven blocking. For event-driven blocking, we let all of the
corrupt users are synchronized to block all their bridges simultaneously on the
300-th day. Figures 2.10 and 2.11 show that right after the massive blocking,
the number of available bridges drops from 500 to 150, and the percentage
of thirsty users rises to 25%. We note that the damage of the event-driven
blocking can be eectively mitigated by keeping a small number of backup
bridges (that are never seen by any user). We can see from Figure 2.12
that with 50 backup bridges (about 10% of deployed bridges), the number of
thirsty users can be reduced by half; with 100 backup bridges, the number of
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Figure 2.11: % of thirsty users in event-driven blocking.
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Figure 2.12: % of thirsty users with backup bridges in event-driven
blocking.
thirsty users is minimized. We also notice that keeping backup bridges cannot
entirely eliminate thirsty users; this is because there are a small fraction
(about 10%) of users who join the system not long before the massive blocking
and have not accumulated enough credits to request new bridges.
2.5.3 Comparison with Proximax
W now compare rBridge with Proximax [13]|the state-of-the-art proxy dis-
tribution scheme. Using the same methodology, we developed an event-based
simulator for Proximax. Since the authors of Proximax did not provide suf-
cient details about how to invite new users, we only consider a static set
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Figure 2.13: User-hours in comparison.
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Figure 2.14: % of thirsty-hours in comparison.
of users for the comparison. We evaluate both rBridge and Proximax under
the aggressive blocking using the same system conguration as before; for
Proximax, we set the maximum delay of distributing bridges at each hop
(i.e., from when a user receives a bridge to when he distributes the bridge to
his friends) to 1 day2.
Figure 2.13 shows that in Proximax less than 5% bridges are able to pro-
duce more than 20 user-hours, and none of the bridges can serve over 126
user-hours. In comparison, in rBridge, over 99% bridges can produce over 20
user-hours, and 57% bridges are not ever blocked and are able to continuously
generate user-hours. In addition, in Proximax 99% of users are always thirsty
2In the simulation of Proximax, we found that higher propagation delay leads to higher
user-hours; hence, we chose a fairly large value (1 day).
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Figure 2.15: User base in comparison.
for bridges, and this number is only 10% for rBridge. Since our simulation
for the comparison only considers a static user group, we are unable to eval-
uate Proximax in terms of the growth of the user base over time; instead,
we measure how many bridges are required to support dierent-sized user
bases for 30 days, while making sure that each existing user has at least one
unblocked bridge at any time. We can see from Figure 2.15 that Proximax
requires a substantially larger number of bridges than rBridge; for instance,
to support 200 users, Proximax requires at least 2400 bridges, while rBridge
only needs 108 bridges. We note that for all these metrics (user-hours of
bridges, thirsty-hours of users, and bridge consumption), the performance of
rBridge is at least one order of magnitude higher than that of Proximax.
Discussion. It is possible to improve Proximax by adopting a more re-
strictive distribution strategy, e.g., limiting how many people a bridge recip-
ient can share the bridge with (i.e., the width of the distribution tree) as
well as how many hops a bridge can be distributed (i.e., the depth of the
distribution tree). Figure 2.13, Figure 2.14, and Figure 2.15 also provide the
results for limiting the maximum width and depth of the distribution tree
to 5. While the restrictive distribution strategy can improve the robustness
of Proximax, it is still much worse than rBridge. More importantly, the
restrictive approach degrades the openness of the system.
The main reason that rBridge outperforms Proximax is that Proximax
calculates \reputation" at the granularity of distribution trees (or called dis-
tribution channels) rather than individual users, and the formation of each
distribution tree is xed and thus an honest user would be permanently \in-
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fected" if he resides in a tree that contains a corrupt user. Whereas, rBridge
allows a user to join a dierent user group when receiving a new bridge, and
keeps track of each individual user's records, based on which the bridge dis-
tributor can reward well-behaving users and punish blockers individually. We
note that recording each individual user' bridge assignment leads to greater
risks of violating users' privacy; we describe how to perfectly protect users'
bridge assignment information in the next section.
Finally, we note that computing reputation merely based on the bridges'
uptime is not the only way to design the reputation system. For instance,
it is possible to extend rBridge by including the reputations of the \intro-
ducees" as a factor to calculate the reputation of the \introducer". However,
the increased complexity of the reputation system makes it even harder (if
possible) to design a practical privacy-preserving mechanism to perfectly pro-
tect users' bridge assignment information. Therefore, our design philosophy
is to make the reputation system as simple as possible, while ensuring its
robustness against various blocking strategies.
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CHAPTER 3
A PRIVACY-PRESERVING USER
REPUTATION SYSTEM FOR TOR
BRIDGE DISTRIBUTION
Tor is primarily designed to provide anonymous communication service; it
uses 3 randomly selected relays to forward users' trac. A key design phi-
losophy of Tor is to avoid any entity knowing which relays are used by a
particular user; for instance, although each user only needs 3 relays, he has
to download all the relays' descriptors from one of the directory authorities
to hide the selected relays from curious directory authorities.
To make it more dicult for adversaries to enumerate bridges, the bridge
distributor gives a limited number of bridges to each user. But this creates
a new privacy problem, as this information could be used to ngerprint the
user: an adversary who can monitor the bridges used for a set of anonymous
tunnels can potentially link them back to the user. As a result, the bridge
distributor becomes a fully trusted component, whereas other components of
Tor must be at most honest-but-curious.
Nevertheless, the privacy issue in Tor bridge distribution has been unfortu-
nately overlooked by all the existing schemes including those that have been
deployed by Tor. They all assume that the bridge distributor is fully trusted
and authorized to know which bridges are used by each user, which degrades
the user anonymity.
In this chapter, we rst present a new attack of de-anonymizing Tor
users using bridge assignment information to demonstrate the importance
of privacy preservation in Tor bridge distribution. We then propose a novel
privacy-preserving Tor bridge distribution scheme based on rBridge [12] using
several cryptographic primitives, and provide performance evaluation results
as well as rigorous security proofs.
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3.1 Motivation of Preserving Privacy in Tor Bridge
Distribution: An Attack of De-anonymizing Tor
Users using Bridge Assignment Information
3.1.1 Anonymity in Tor
Tor is a practical system aiming to provide low-latency anonymous communi-
cation for ordinary users by using onion encryption tunnels each constructed
with three randomly picked relays. Tor aims to achieve a practical goal
regarding protecting user anonymity. In particular, it aims to achieve \end-
to-end " anonymity, i.e., preventing attackers from learning both the initiator
(i.e., the user) and the destination (e.g., a website), as a real-world adversary
is less interested in only learning whether a particular user is using Tor or
whether a particular website is being viewed. This anonymity property is
one of a set of more formally dened anonymity properties (e.g., sender and
receiver anonymity) proposed by Ptzmann and Hansen [29]. In this work,
we focus on analyzing end-to-end anonymity of Tor.
In our threat model, we assume the adversary can control a xed set of
malicious relays that comprise a ratio of f of all relays and can learn in-
formation about users' trac only from these malicious relays (for clarity,
we do not consider AS-level adversaries or malicious websites). This implies
that the adversary can learn the destination of a connection of a particular
user if and only if the exit relay is malicious. Likewise, the adversary can
directly see the user's address if the guard (or the bridge) of the connection
is malicious.
!"#$%&'
()*"$
+#$$,& -.#/
Figure 3.1: For a compromised circuit with malicious rst- and last-hop
relays, both the user's identity and the communication destination can be
observed.
A widely used metric to evaluate Tor's anonymity is the percentage of
\compromised" circuits, i.e., those having both malicious rst- and last-hop
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relays. An illustration of compromised circuits is shown in Figure 3.1. The
ratio of compromised circuits can be roughly estimated as f2, if we do not
consider relays' bandwidth in relay selection. For instance, when f = 20%,
about 4% of the established circuits will fail to preserve users' anonymity, i.e.,
the adversary will be able to link the websites a user is browsing to the user.
However, as we shall show later, bridge distribution without privacy preser-
vation opens up another way for adversaries to compromise users' anonymity,
and this attack works even when none of the user's bridges/guards is mali-
cious and thus substantially degrades the anonymity of Tor.
3.1.2 Fingerprinting Users using Bridge Assignment
Information
Guards are rst-hop relays of anonymous communication circuits, and bridges
are a special type of guards, which are used by users in censored countries
as stepping stones to circumvent censorship. In existing bridge distribution
strategies adopted by Tor, the bridge distributor knows exactly what bridges
are given to a particular user, and thus can use the bridge assignment infor-
mation as a ngerprint to identify users. For instance, assuming that each
user is given 3 bridges, if the adversary is able to learn that 3 bridges, say B1,
B2 and B3, belong to the same user, then the adversary who has access to the
bridge assignment information (e.g., by colluding with the distributor) can
easily narrow the anonymity set of the user down to a small subset of users
who are given B1, B2 and B3. As we can see in Figure 3.2 that when each
bridge/guard is selected at uniform random, over 95% of bridge/guard sets
are shared by fewer than 0:2% users, and over 70% of bridge/guard sets can
be uniquely mapped to a single user. Figure 3.3 shows the results when the
selection of bridge/guard is weighted using each bridge/guard's bandwidth
(as the guard selection strategy currently adopted by Tor); in this case, about
60% of bridge/guard sets can uniquely identify their owners.
Therefore, besides compromising the rst-hop relay of a user's anonymous
circuit { which can be viewed as a direct way to learning the user's identity,
the adversary can also indirectly connect an observed communication des-
tination to the user by using bridge assignment information as a link joint.
In particular, we present a long-term attack that leverages web cookie and
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Figure 3.2: CDF of percentage of users who share a common bridge/guard
set, when each bridge/guard is selected at uniform random
(#users = 1500).
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Figure 3.3: CDF of percentage of users who share a common bridge/guard
set, when bridge/guard selection is weighted using bridge/guard's
bandwidth (#users = 1500).
bridge assignment information to de-anonymize users.
3.1.3 Grouping Bridges using Web Cookies
As we discussed above, bridge assignment information allows an adversary
to link a particular bridge/guard set to its owner (i.e., the user) with high
probability; thus, if the adversary is able to nd out the bridge/guard set
and link the user's visited websites to the bridge/guard set, she can nally
link the websites to the user.
The key of this attack is to nd out which bridges/guards belong to the
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same user (i.e., in the same bridge/guard set). As we know, when the exit
relay is malicious, the adversary can see not only the communication destina-
tions (e.g., the IP address of the website) but also all of the communication
content, including web cookie, as long as the application layer protocol does
not use encryption (such as HTTPS). Web cookie is a small piece of data sent
from a website and stored in a user's web browser while a user is browsing a
website, and when the user visits the same website again, the data stored in
the cookie will be retrieved by the website to notify the website of the user's
previous activity.1 By keeping track of web cookies observed from malicious
exit relays, the adversary can infer that multiple circuits that share the same
cookie belong to the same user. For instance, in the example shown in Fig-
ure 3.4, the adversary can observe cookies from circuits having malicious exit
relays (i.e., C1, C3, C4 and C5); out of them, C1, C3 and C5 share a common
cookie X, and thus they belong to the same user. Furthermore, if multiple
web cookies are observed from a circuit, e.g., C1 and C3, and one of cookies
is the target cookie (i.e., X), then we can learn that the other cookies also
belong to the user and therefore can be added to the set of target cookies
(e.g., the target cookie set in this example is fX;Y; Zg). As a result, we can
infer that C1, C3, C4, and C5 belong to the target user, since they have at
least one of the target cookies.
Cookies {X, Y}
???
Cookies {Y}
Cookies {X, Z}
Cookies {X}
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
Linkable
Figure 3.4: An example of linking circuits based on web cookies.
We note that this cookie-based circuit correlation can be carried out over
1We note that although the presented attack only works when web cookies can be
observed by malicious exit relays, our attack strategy is generic and can be applied to
cases when there are no direct observations of cookies, e.g., when users clean up web
cookies after each use of Tor. This is because our attack only requires some application-
level information that can link dierent web browsing transactions of the user; besides
web cookies, such application-level information could be usernames, photos, aliations,
addresses, personal interests, etc.
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a long period of time, since web cookies can typically live in the client's
web browser for a long time. In addition, we are less interested in the case
where the rst-hop relay of a circuit is malicious, because in this case the
adversary can always learn the user's identity due to direct connection no
matter whether bridge assignment information is available. To demonstrate
the importance of protecting bridge assignment information, we focus on
the scenario when all of the bridges/guards of the target victim user are
honest and show that even in this case an adversary with bridge assignment
information is still able to de-anonymize the user.
For a circuit having a malicious middle relay (such as C1, C2, and C4
in Figure 3.4), the bridge/guard of the circuit is observable. Therefore, if
both the exit relay and the middle relay are malicious, the adversary can
observe both the web cookies of visited websites and the bridge/guard, and
associate them together. As a result, the adversary can group the observed
bridges/guards of circuits that are linkable by target cookies. For instance,
bridges/guards of C1 and C4 can be grouped together using the target cookies
X and Y .
Although the probability of having both malicious middle and exit relays
in a circuit is low, over a long time the adversary can have a fairly good
chance to accumulate multiple circuits that share a common cookie and have
observable bridges/guards. Furthermore, we note that getting a circuit with
both malicious middle and exit relays is not the only way to link an ob-
served cookie to an observed bridge/guard. We next show how to leverage
timing information in circuit scheduling to nd pairs of observed cookies and
bridges/guards. This approach can expedite grouping bridges/guards of the
target user.
3.1.4 Linking Circuits based on Timing of Circuit Scheduling
Since Tor aims to provide low-latency anonymous communication, it adopts
some mechanisms to optimize performance. For example, the client software
predicts the number and types of circuits that are likely to be needed and pre-
emptively builds them to avoid the delay of run-time circuit establishment.
In particular, throughout the online period, the client maintains two usable
circuits at any time for each port that was seen in the past hour. By \usable",
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we refer to a circuit being able to accept new connections.2 A clean circuit
becomes dirty once a connection is relayed on it. A dirty circuit stays usable
only for 10 minutes, and a clean circuit can stay usable for 1 hour. All of the
established circuits are closed when the client goes oine.
Because of the circuit scheduling mechanism, the timing of building/closing
circuits follows specic patterns. For instance, once a circuit becomes unus-
able (i.e., 1 hour after being built for a clean circuit, and 10 minutes after
becoming dirty for a dirty circuit), it's highly likely that the client will build
a new circuit to replace the expired circuit. Such timing information can
help the adversary decide whether two observed circuits belong to the same
user. For example, if one circuit is built right after another circuit becomes
unusable, it is very likely that they are both built by the same client.
We now dene the rules of linking circuits based on the timing of circuit
scheduling. We let Tbuild, Tclose and Tdirty denote the times when a circuit is
built, closed, and becomes dirty, respectively. We assume that the adversary
can infer Tbuild, Tclose, and Tdirty of a circuit, as long as one of the relays of
the circuit is malicious. We dene  as a very short period of time, e.g., a
few seconds. We call two circuits Ci and Cj are highly likely to be co-resident
if the one of following conditions is satised:
1. Ci is clean, and Cj:Tbuild   (Ci:Tbuild + 1h)  
2. Ci is dirty, and Cj:Tbuild   (Ci:Tdirty + 10m)  
3. Cj:Tclose   Ci:Tclose  
Our previous analysis on the example shown in Figure 3.4 is that the
adversary is able to link C1, C3, C4, and C5 together based on the common
cookie X, but only knows that the bridges/guards of C1 and C4 belong to
the target user because the rst hops of C3 and C5 are not observed (in other
words, the cookies observed from C3 and C5 cannot help us infer the user's
bridge/guard set). Whereas, the approach to linking circuits based on timing
of circuit scheduling allows us to make use of circuits (like C3) that do not
2For a connection request made by an upper-level application, the client rst tries to
assign it to an existing circuit that can support the connection, i.e., the state of the circuit
is either clean or dirty & usable and the exit policies of its exit relay can support the port
of the connection. If there exist multiple suitable existing circuits, the client prefers a
dirty & usable circuit to a clean circuit; if candidate circuits are all clean, a more recently
built circuit is preferred; if candidate circuits are all dirty, a circuit that became dirty
more recently is preferred.
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have directly observed bridges/guards. For example, if there exists a circuit
that has an observable rst hop (say C2 in Figure 3.4) and is highly likely
co-resident to C3 according to the three conditions presented before, we can
combine the observations from C2 and C3 (i.e., C2's bridge/guard and C3's
cookie X) together and use them to infer the target user's bridge/guard set.
In this case, the adversary can infer that with high probability the observed
bridges/guards of C1, C2 and C4 belong to the target user.
3.1.5 An Attack of De-anonymizing Users using Bridge
Assignment Information
We now present the attack strategy to de-anonymize users using bridge as-
signment information. First of all, the adversary records information of each
observed circuit, including Tbuild, Tclose, Tdirty, and observed relays of the
circuit; if the observed circuit has a malicious exit relay, the adversary also
records the observed cookies and communication destinations. The adver-
sary selects an interested target user, who is the owner of one of the observed
cookies (say X) provided by a target website, and aims to nd out the real
identity of the target user. As we mentioned before, we are only interested in
de-anonymizing users who have no malicious bridges/guards, which is infeasi-
ble without using bridge assignment information. Note that once the target
user is de-anonymized, the adversary learns not only this user's browsing
histories on the website that creates the initial target cookie X, but also his
visiting records on many other websites, since the adversary can accumulate
cookies of the user over time.
The adversary keeps a list of candidate bridges/guards of this target user
with each entry on the list containing the ID of a bridge/guard that has been
discovered at least once using the two approaches we have described, i.e.,
satisfying one of the two conditions below:
1. The bridge/guard is on a circuit C that has both malicious middle and
exit relays, and at least one of the cookies observed from C is a target
cookie (and the rest cookies are added to the target cookie set).
2. The bridge/guard is on a circuit C that has a malicious relay and is
highly likely co-resident to another circuit C 0 that has a malicious exit
relay, and at least one of the cookies observed from C 0 is a target cookie.
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Each entry also contains a counter, which records how many times this
bridge/guard has been discovered; for a candidate bridge/guard that meets
Condition 1 once, its counter value is xed as the maximum value because
we can be sure that this bridge/guard belongs to the target user. The list is
updated as the adversary collects more observations over time. In the end,
the adversary outputs the three candidate bridges/guards with the highest
counter values (assuming each user is given three bridges/guards) as the
bridge/guard set of the target user, and then she can look up the mapping
tables between bridge/guard sets and users to identify the target user or
narrow down the anonymity set of the target user to a small number of
users.
3.1.6 Evaluation
To evaluate the eectiveness of this attack, we build a simulator by simulat-
ing the circuit scheduling and path selection mechanisms of the client-side
software of Tor. We run our simulation on a smaller sized Tor network, by
randomly selecting a subset of all Tor relays while using their original relay
descriptors (including bandwidth, tags, families, and etc.) downloaded from
Tor website3. We randomly pick 150 relays and use 1500 users, and run
the simulation for 100 days. We employ bandwidth weighted bridge/guard
selection. Each user is congured to be online for T hours every day, where
T is uniformly random in [1h; 3h], and during each online period, each user
makes connections following a poisson process with mean value 10 minutes.
According to the study in [30], we model the dwell time of each web visit
using Weibull distribution with the parameters suggested in [30] shape k = 1
and scale  = 70s. We use the top 100 most popular websites published by
Google doubleclick4 as connection destinations, and set the initial cookie as
the one created by the most popular website.
We can see from Figure 3.5 that the number of events of discovering can-
didate bridges/guards grows almost in linear with time, and as shown in Fig-
ure 3.6, the number target cookies obtained by the adversary also increases
accordingly. Figure 3.7 shows that the number of entries on the candidate
list increases with time, but its growing rate is sublinear because the same
3https://metrics.torproject.org/data.html
4http://www.google.com/adplanner/static/top1000/
36
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90
#d
isc
ov
er
ie
s
Time (day)
f = 20%
f = 10%
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discovered with 95% condence interval.
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90
#t
ar
ge
t c
oo
kie
s
Time (day)
f = 20%
f = 10%
Figure 3.6: Number of target cookies with 95% condence interval.
bridge/guard may be discovered for multiple times.
We evaluate the accuracy of this de-anonymizing attack by computing
the probability that the true bridge/guard set is contained in the top few
entries of the candidate list. We can see from Figure 3.8 that when 20% of
relays are malicious, after 90 days of observation, the top 3 entries on the
candidate lists are the true bridge/guard set with probability of over 60%;
with 10% malicious relays, this probability is about 30%. Considering that
each bridge/bridge can be typically mapped to a very small number of users
as shown in Figure ??, there is a fairly good chance for the adversary to
de-anonymize the target user.
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3.2 Related Work on Anonymous Authentication and
Anonymous Reputation Systems
Researchers have put forward several designs for anonymous authentication
and anonymous reputation systems [31{34] that are similar to what we are
seeking. Au et al. [34] proposed a k-times anonymous authentication (k-
TAA) scheme that allows a user to be authenticated anonymously for a
bounded number of times. The work in [31, 33] extended this scheme to
allow revocation without trusted third parties. Later, Au et al. [32] further
extended the anonymous authentication schemes to support users' reputation
management. We note that, however, none of these schemes is applicable to
bridge distribution due to inability to limit misbehavior of malicious users.
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In bridge distribution, a user's reputation that is calculated based on the
user's bridge assignment records should be managed by the user himself to
avoid leaking the bridge information to the bridge distributor, which raises
the risk that a malicious user could manipulate his reputation records, e.g.,
increasing his credit balance. Whereas, in the aforementioned schemes, users'
reputation is calculated by servers that are trusted to perform the reputa-
tion calculation, and thus they do not need to consider potential cheating of
malicious users.
3.3 Challenges and Requirements
Our goal is to provide perfect privacy preservation for Tor users in rBridge by
hiding bridge assignment information from any parties including the bridge
distributor.
In rBridge, a user (U) can get a bridge only if he can authenticate himself to
D by presenting a valid credential (recall that in the basic scheme, a credential
includes the following information UkkfBi; i; igki=1). Firstly, in order to
unlink the user from his assigned bridges, we should conceal the user's
identity by replacing U's real identity with a pseudonym on his credential
and letting him build a Tor circuit to communicate with D to hide his IP
address.
However, the above measures are not sucient. Suppose U has received 10
bridges from D (who knows the bridges but not U's identity), and 2 of them
are malicious and know U's identity due to direct contact and collude with D;
then it is highly likely that D can link U to all of his bridges, since very few
users happen to know both of the malicious bridges. A natural solution to
this is using Oblivious Transfer (OT) for privacy-preserving bridge retrieval
| preventing D from learning which bridge is retrieved when U requests a new
bridge (called a transaction). However, since a user is very likely to request a
new bridge right after one of his bridges gets blocked, D can infer the blocked
bridge by checking which bridge was recently blocked. As a result, D can
learn all of U's (blocked) bridges as long as D can link dierent transactions
of U. Therefore, unlinkability of transactions is required to avoid such
information leaks.
Thirdly, since we intend to hide the bridge assignment from D, the bridge
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related information in U's credential, such as fBi; i; ig, should be written
and updated by U, rather than by D. This raises the risk that a malicious
user could put incorrect information on his credential, e.g., by changing the
credits i or replacing Bi with another bridge B
0
i so that he can block Bi
without being punished. Therefore, we also need to protect the integrity of
credentials.
Although researchers have proposed several designs for anonymous authen-
tication/reputation systems [31{34], none of them is able to ensure integrity
of credentials. In this work, we propose a novel privacy-preserving user rep-
utation scheme that is specially designed for bridge distribution and satis-
es all the three aforementioned requirements. Our design integrates OT
with several other cryptographic primitives (such as commitments and zero-
knowledge proofs) to both preserve users' privacy and prevent misbehavior of
corrupt users. We start with introducing the cryptographic primitives used
in our construction.
3.4 Cryptographic Building Blocks
We next introduce the cryptographic primitives used in the construction of
the privacy-preserving rBridge scheme.
3.4.1 1-out-of-m Oblivious Transfer
1-out-of-m Oblivious Transfer (denoted by
 
m
1

-OT) is a secure two-party
computation protocol, where the sender hasm secrets and the chooser can get
1 and only 1 secret from the sender without revealing any information about
which secret is selected. We use the two-round
 
m
1

-OT scheme proposed
in [35] to construct rBridge due to its simplicity of implementation.
To make it hard for corrupt users to collaboratively enumerate bridges, we
let D (i.e., the sender) randomly shue the list of available bridges (i.e., the
secrets) before running the OT protocol with each user (i.e., the chooser),
so that the user will randomly \choose" which bridge to get. Because of
the randomized OT, it is possible that a user gets a bridge that is already
assigned to him even though the chance is very small. We show how to deal
with duplicate bridges in Appendix A.
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3.4.2 Commitment
A commitment scheme enables a party to create the digital equivalent of
an envelope for a secret. It supports two important properties: hiding
protects the secrecy of the committed message, and binding ensures it can
only be opened to the committed message. Pedersen commitments [36] are
information-theoretically hiding and binding under the discrete logarithm
assumption. We use (C;O) = CMT(M) to denote a Pedersen commitment
to a secret M , where C is the commitment and O is the opening to the
commitment.
In rBridge, we use commitments to conceal the content on a user's cre-
dential. For instance, to hide the amount of credits , U can compute a
commitment of , i.e., (C; O) = CMT(), and put C in his credential.
To prevent U from manipulating his credential (e.g., increasing ), we let
D sign C using his private key SKD, i.e.,  = Sign(SKD; C) and tag
the signature  to the credential, and U needs to prove to D that both the
commitment and the signature are valid. To prevent D from linking U's trans-
actions based on the values of commitments and signatures, we need another
cryptographic primitive|zero-knowledge proof.
3.4.3 Zero-Knowledge Proof
In a zero-knowledge proof scheme, a prover convinces a verier that some
statement is true while the verier learns nothing except the validity of the
statement. A zero-knowledge proof can be converted into a corresponding
non-interactive version in the random oracle model via Fiat-Shamir heuris-
tic [37]. We follow the notation introduced by Camenisch and Stadler [38],
e.g., NIPKf(x) : y = gxg denotes a \non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge of integer x, s.t., y = gx, and g is public and x is secret.".
Our main use of zero-knowledge proofs is to prove knowledge of com-
mitments and possession of signatures. For instance, U can construct the
following proof:
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 = NIPK
8>>>><>>>>:
(; C; O; ) :
 > ^
(C; O) = CMT()^
Verify(PKD; ; C) = Accept
9>>>>=>>>>;
to prove that his credit balance  is above the threshold  and is not
tampered (i.e., correctly signed), without revealing the credit balance , the
commitment C, the opening O, or the signature  (where PKD is the
public key of D, and Verify is the function to verify the signature ). In our
construction, we employ the k-TAA blind signature scheme proposed by Au
et al. [34] because of its compatibility with zero-knowledge proofs.
3.5 Scheme
3.5.1 Anonymous Credential
A key concept in rBridge is the anonymous credential, which anonymously
records the user's bridges and reputation and allows the user to anonymously
authenticate himself to D. Each part of the credential is signed by D individ-
ually, so that they can be veried and updated separately. In particular, an
anonymous credential contains the following information:
xkf; C; O; gkf!;C!; O!; !gkfBi; i; i; Ci; Oi; igki=1
where x is the secret key that is selected by U when registering the credential,
| is the signature on C|, and ! denotes the latest time when the user re-
quests an invitation ticket (! is used to prevent corrupt users from repeatedly
requesting tickets; we discuss this later). We note that all the information in
the credential must be kept secret from D.
To prevent a corrupt user from replacing some part of his credential with
that of others' credentials (e.g., a higher  from a well-behaving colluding
user), we use x to link dierent parts of the credential by including x in each
of their commitments. To be specic, (C; O) = CMT(; x), (C!; O!) =
CMT(!; x), and (Ci; Oi) = CMT(Bi; i; i; x). To get a credential, a new user
runs the following registration protocol.
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3.5.2 Registration
A new user U rst presents an invitation ticket to D. An invitation ticket is
an one-time token formed as tk = fr;HMACscrtD(r)g, where r is a random
number and scrtD is a secret only known to D; the ticket is veriable to
D, and cannot be forged by anyone else. Then U runs
 
m
1

-OT with D to
get k initial bridges B1;    ; Bk5. After that, U randomly picks a secret
key x and performs the following computations: set  = 0 and compute
(C; O) = CMT(; x); set ! = Tcur (recall that Tcur denotes the current
time) and compute (C!; O!) = CMT(!; x); for each i 2 [1; k], set i = Tcur,
i = 0, and compute (Ci; Oi) = CMT(Bi; i; i; x). To prevent multiple
colluding users from using the same x to share some parts of their credentials,
U is required to provide an indicator of his selected x, formed as x = OWF(x),
to prove that x has not been used by other users while hiding x from D.
(wherein OWF() is simply a discrete-log based one-way function.)
Note that since D does not know the bridges received by U (i.e., fBigki=1), U
couSectiold try to put other bridges on his credential, i.e., replacing Bi with
Bi in CMT(Bi; i; i; x), so that he can block all of fBigki=1 instantly without
worrying about potential loss of credits. To prevent this attack, D needs to
verify that the bridges to be written in the credential are actually the bridges
that U received in OT. To achieve this, we let D (before running OT) generate
a pair of one-time public/private keys (denoted by PKoD , SK
o
D), give PK
o
D to
U, use SKoD to sign each available bridge Bj, and tag the signature 
o
j to Bj.
After OT, U gets fBikoi gki=1, and he needs to prove the possession of a valid
signature oi on Bi. Intuitively, U is no longer able to replace Bi with any
other bridge (Bi ) that is not one of the k received bridges, because he does
not have a signature on Bi . In addition, we let U provide D a random nonce
nonj for each available bridge Bj; nonj is included in the computation of 
o
j
to prevent D from later nding out which bridges are retrieved by U using
these signatures (refer to Appendix B for details).
To get the credential, U constructs the following proof:
5U needs to run k rounds of
 
m
1

-OT to get k bridges. While it is possible to
invoke one round of
 
m
k

-OT, but its complexity is higher when k is much smaller
than m (typically k = 3).
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1 = NIPK
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(x;; O; !; O!; fBi; i; i; oi ; Oigki=1) :Vk
i=1 ((Ci; Oi) = CMT(Bi; i; i; x)^
Verify(PKoD ; 
o
i ; Bi) = Accept^
i = Tcur ^ i = 0)^
(C; O) = CMT(; x)^
x = OWF(x)^
 = 0^
(C!; O!) = CMT(!; x)^
! = Tcur
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
and sends xkCkC!kfCigki=1k1 to D.
After verifying the validity of 1 and the freshness of x, D signs C, C!,
and Ci (1  i  k), respectively, and sends the signatures k!kfigki=1 to
U. Finally, D adds x to the list of indicators of used secret keys (denoted by
elistx) to prevent other users from re-using it.
Note that in the privacy-preserving scheme, it is infeasible for D to count
the number of users who ever connected to each bridge; instead, we let each
bridge notify D once the number of users that ever connect to it exceeds the
threshold g, and then D will exclude the bridge from the list when running
OT. (The bridge could let each new user register himself upon the rst
connection, e.g., by setting up a password [26], in order to count the ever
connected users.)
3.5.3 Updating Credit Balance
U can update his credit balance  with recently earned credits from time to
time. Suppose the credits are from Bu. The new credit balance is calculated
as ~ =  + ~u   u, where ~u = Credit(Tcur   u). U needs to show that Bu
is not blocked. To do so, we let D compute bj = OWF( Bj) for each of the
blocked bridges f Bjg mj=1 (where m is the total number of blocked bridges)
and publish fbjg mj=1; U needs to prove that OWF(Bu) is not equal to any of
fbjg mj=1.
D must record expired credentials to prevent re-use of old credentials (e.g.,
those with more credits). For this, we let U provide an indicator of  to
show that  is up-to-date. Note that we cannot use  = OWF() as the
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indicator, since D could try all of the signatures he has generated to nd a
match between  and  to link U's transactions. To address this, we craft
a special indicator function  = Indic() based on the feature of k-TAA
blind signature [34] (Essentially, this indicator function rst converts  into
another form 0 using a random factor and then applies an one-way function
to 0 to get . See Appendix B for more details.)
In particular, U constructs the following proof:
2 = NIPK
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(x;; C; O; ; Bu; u; u; Cu; Ou; u;
~u; ~Ou; ~; ~O) :V m
j=1 (bj 6= OWF(Bu))^
(Cu; Ou) = CMT(Bu; u; u; x)^
Verify(PKD; u; Cu) = Accept^
(C; O) = CMT(; x)^
Verify(PKD; ; C) = Accept^
 = Indic()^
~u = Credit(Tcur   u)^
~ =  + ~u   u^
( ~Cu; ~Ou) = CMT(Bu; u; ~u; x)^
( ~C; ~O) = CMT(~; x)^
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
U builds a Tor circuit (using one of his bridges as the entry relay) to send
k ~Ck ~Cuk2 to D.
D veries 2 and checks that  is not on the list of seen indicators (de-
noted by elist); then, D signs ~C and ~Cu, sends the signatures ~ and
~u to U, and adds  to elist. Finally, U updates his credential with
~; ~C; ~O; ~; ~u; ~Cu; ~Ou, and ~u.
3.5.4 Getting a New Bridge
To get a new bridge, U rst needs to prove that one of his bridges (say Bb)
on his credential has been blocked and his credit balance is higher than  .
Since a user usually requests a new bridge right after one of his bridges got
blocked which allows D to gure out what Bb is by checking which bridge
was recently blocked, we do not intend to hide Bb from U. We note that
revealing Bb will not degrade the anonymity, as long as D is unable to link
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the transaction of replacing Bb with other transactions of U.
U rst sends Bb to D through a Tor circuit. After verifying Bb is blocked, D
replies with b (i.e., the time when Bb got blocked). The new credit balance
of U is ~ = +(~b b)  , where ~b = Credit(b  b), by considering the
credits earned from Bb and the cost for getting a new bridge. U constructs
the following proof:
3 = NIPK
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(x;; C; O; ; b; b; Cb; Ob; b;
~b; ~; ~O) :
(Cb; Ob) = CMT(Bb; b; b; x)^
Verify(PKD; b; Cb) = Accept^
b = Indic(b)^
(C; O) = CMT(; x)^
Verify(PKD; ; C) = Accept^
 = Indic()^
~b = Credit(b   b)^
~ =  + ~b   b    ^
~ > 0^
( ~C; ~O) = CMT(~; x)
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
and sends kbk ~Ck3 to D. Note that we use b to make sure each blocked
bridge can be used only once to request a new bridge.
After verifying  =2 elist, b =2 elistBb , and 3 (where elistBb denotes
the list of used indicators of Bb), D adds  to elist and b to elistBb .
Similar to the registration, U runs
 
m
1

-OT with D to obtain a new bridge ~Bb
with a tagged signature ~ob . Then, U sets ~b = Tcur and
~b = 0, computes
( ~Cb; ~Ob) = CMT( ~Bb; ~b; ~b; x), constructs the following proof:
4 = NIPK
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(x; ~; ~O; ~Bb; ~b; ~b; ~
o
b ;
~Ob) :
( ~C; ~O) = CMT(~; x)^
~b = Tcur ^ ~b = 0^
( ~Cb; ~Ob) = CMT( ~Bb; ~b; ~b; x)^
Verify(PKoD ; ~
o
b ;
~Bb) = Accept
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
and sends ~Cbk4 to D.
D veries 4, signs ~C and ~Cb, and sends ~ and ~b to U. Finally, U updates
his credential with ~; ~C; ~O; ~; ~Bb; ~b; ~b; ~Cb; ~Ob, and ~b.
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3.5.5 Inviting New Users
U can request D for an invitation ticket as long as his credit balance is higher
than . D grants the request with certain probability. Recall that ! in the
credential represents the latest time when U requested an invitation ticket.
To prevent a corrupt user from repeatedly requesting invitation tickets to
increase his chance of getting one, we let each requesting user prove that his
last time requesting a ticket is at least ! days ago, i.e., Tcur   ! > !. In
particular, to request a ticket, U constructs the proof:
5 = NIPK
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(x;; C; O; ; !; C!; O!; !; ~!;
~O!; ~O) :
(C; O) = CMT(; x)^
Verify(PKD; ; C) = Accept^
 = Indic()^
(C!; O!) = CMT(!; x)^
Verify(PKD; !; C!) = Accept^
! = Indic(!)^
 > ^
Tcur   ! > !^
~! = Tcur^
( ~C!; ~O!) = CMT(~!; x)^
( ~C; ~O) = CMT(; x)
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
and sends k!k ~Ck ~C!k5 to D through a Tor circuit.
After verifying  =2 elist, ! =2 elist! and 5, D signs ~C and ~C!, sends
~ and ~! to U, and adds  to elist and ! to elist!. Then, D ips a
coin to decide whether to grant the request: if yes, D generates a ticket for
U; otherwise, U needs to wait at least ! days to try again.
3.6 Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss potential attacks on the privacy-preserving rBridge
scheme. We present rigorous security proof in Section 3.8.
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3.6.1 Curious Bridge Distributor
One of the major security requirements in the privacy-preserving scheme is to
ensure dierent transactions of a particular user are unlinkable. A typical way
to link a user's transactions is based on the credential content. For example,
suppose in the x-th transaction U received a new bridge BX and updated his
credential with some signed information of BX (e.g., BX , X , and X); later,
when BX gets blocked and U requests a new bridge to replace it in the y-th
transaction, U needs to use the signed information to prove that, e.g., BX was
assigned to him and a certain amount of credits should be earned from BX ;
however, such information can be utilized by D to link the two transactions.
(Similar attacks are applicable in the cases when U updates his credit balance
or requests invitation tickets.) To ensure the unlinkability of transactions,
rBridge uses commitments and zero-knowledge proofs to conceal the content
of the credential, so that D only knows the validity of the credential but learns
nothing about the content of the credential.
Although BX is revealed to D in the y-th transaction (i.e., after BX gets
blocked), D is unable to link BX to U due to the use of a Tor circuit; more
importantly, since BX is perfectly hidden in any other transactions, D cannot
use BX to link any two transactions of U.
Similarly, D can learn U's identity (i.e., his IP address, but nothing else) in
the registration, since at that moment U has no bridge to build a Tor circuit
to hide his IP address (if he does not use any other circumvention tool or ask
an existing user to perform the registration on his behalf). Nevertheless, D
is unable to learn which bridges are retrieved because of U in OT; moreover,
since U's IP address will be hidden in all the later transactions of U, D cannot
use U's IP address to link his transactions.
3.6.2 Malicious Users
In the privacy-preserving scheme, a corrupt user could try to manipulate the
information on his credential, e.g., increasing the credit balance. rBridge uses
zero-knowledge proofs with the help of blind signatures to verify the correct-
ness of the credential without revealing any information in the credential.
In addition, since D does not know what bridge is retrieved by U in OT, U
could try to replace the received bridge with another one when updating his
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Table 3.1: Performance (averaged over 100 runs)
Operation
Comp. (s)
Comm. (KB)
U D
Registration 5.15 17.44 388.1
Updating credit balance 0.51 0.47 34.7
Getting a new bridge 5.35 17.62 340.1
Inviting new users 0.27 0.16 2.0
credential so that he can block the assigned bridge instantly without worrying
about potential loss of credits. To address this, we let D employ one-time
signatures to make sure the bridge written in the credential is indeed the
bridge that the user received in OT.
Furthermore, malicious users could try to re-use old credentials that have
more credits or use a blocked bridge to request more than one new bridges.
To prevent these, we let D record all the used credentials as well as the claimed
blocked bridges, and ask U to provide indicators to prove that the presented
credential or the claimed blocked bridge has not been used before.
3.7 Performance Evaluation
We implemented rBridge using Paring-Based Crytography (PBC) Library6
and GNU Multiple Precision library7 in C++, and used OpenSSL for hash
related routines. The credential system, built upon k-TAA signature, was
implemented with Type-A curves, which is dened in the PBC Library in
the form of E : y2 = x3 + x over the eld Fq for some prime q. Bilinear
groups G1 and G2, both formed by points over E(Fq), are of order p for
some prime p, such that p is a factor of q + 1. Using the default setting, p
and q are 160-bit and 512-bit in length respectively. We implemented the 
m
1

-OT protocol in [35] using G1 as the underlying group. We consider there
are 1000 available bridges and 100 blocked bridges, and set the size of each
bridge descriptor the same as that of the current bridge descriptor (208 bits
including 32-bit IP, 16-bit port, and 160-bit ngerprint).
We measured the computational times for U and D on a Dell Precision
T3500 workstation with a quad-core 2.67 GHz Intel Xeon W3550 CPU and
6http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/
7http://gmplib.org/
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12 GB RAM, running Ubuntu 10.04. Table 3.1 shows that it takes only
less than 0.5 seconds for U and D to update credit balance or process an
invitation ticket request. It takes longer to perform the initial registration or
request a new bridge, which are about 5 seconds and 17 seconds for U and D,
respectively. The majority of computational times are spent on the retrieval
of new bridges. We note that these operations are quite infrequent; each
user only needs to register once, and according to our simulation results, the
averaged time interval to request new bridges is 133 days. We believe these
occasional computations can be handled by both U and D with fairly strong
computational power. In addition, we note that the user does not need to
idly wait for the server completing the cryptographic operations, because as
long as the user has an unblocked bridge he can proceed to do web browsing
after submitting the requests to the bridge distributor.
We also measured the communication costs. The operations of registration
and getting a new bridge incur 388 KB and 340 KB communication overheads
respectively, and the data transmission for any other operation is less than 35
KB. In comparison, with 2000 Tor relays, each Tor client needs to download
a 120 KB \network status document" every 3 hours, and 1.25 MB of relay
\descriptors" spread over 18 hours [39].
3.8 Cryptographic Proof
3.8.1 Security Model
The protocol of rBridge involves two parties: the bridge distributor D, and
the user U. A corrupt U aims to deceive D with false credential information,
such as manipulated credit balance, and a corrupt D aims to learn information
about U's assigned bridges. We consider either of U and D (not both) could
be controlled by the adversary. A compromised party can perfectly collude
with the adversary by sharing information and executing instructions from
the adversary. For presentation simplicity, we consider the adversary and the
compromised party as one joint entity referred to as the \adversary".
We use the real/ideal world paradigm to prove security. In the real world,
on inputs (or instructions) from the environment Z, the parties interact ac-
cording to the protocol  in the presence of a real adversary A, and the out-
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puts of the parties are handed to Z. In the ideal world, there is a \trusted"
ideal process F to carry out the desired task in the presence of an ideal adver-
sary S, namely, the parties interact with each other through F that provides
the desired computation results, and hand their outputs to Z. In addition,
the adversary (A or S) can interact with the environment Z throughout the
course of the protocol and inuence Z generating inputs for the parties. The
protocol  is called secure if it \emulates" the ideal functionality F . More
formally, we have:
Denition 1. The protocol  is secure if for any adversary A there exists
an ideal adversary S such that no environment Z can tell with non-negligible
probability whether it is interacting with A and  or with S and the ideal
process F . We call  securely realizes F .
The ideal functionality F of rBridge is dened as below.
 At the initialization, F gets a copy of the list of available bridges
fBjgmj=1 from D.
 On input (register; tk; U) from U, where tk is an invitation ticket, F 
forwards it to D. D as in the protocol  checks the freshness and validity
of tk. If the ticket is veried, D sets b = 1 and adds tk to elisttk;
otherwise, b is set as 0. D then sends b to F . If b = 1, F randomly
picks k initial bridges fBigki=1 from the available bridges, creates an
entry hU;; fBi; i; igki=1i in the user database, where  = 0, i = Tcur,
and i = 0, increments the counter count(Bi), i 2 [1; k], which records
the number of users assigned to Bi, and nally sends fBigki=1 to U.
Otherwise, F sends ? to U.8
 On input (update; Bu; U) from U, F rst checks whether U has a record
in the user database, Bu was assigned to U, and Bu is not on the list
of blocked bridges. If not, F aborts by returning ? to U. Otherwise,
F computes ~u = Credit(Tcur  u), ~ = + ~u u, and updates u,
 with ~u, ~ in U's record, and nally sends > to U and (update) to D,
respectively.
8Once count(Bi) reaches the capacity upper bound g, F removes Bi from the list of
bridges for distribution. F periodically informs D what bridges are fully occupied so that
D can make plans for new bridge recruitment.
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 On input (query; Bb), F checks whether Bb is on the list of blocked
bridges. If so, F returns Bb's blocking time b; otherwise, F returns
?.
 On input (newbridge; Bb; U) from U, F rst checks whether U has a
record in the user database, Bb was assigned to U and is on the list of
blocked bridges, and + ~b b >  , where ~b = Credit(b  b), b is
the time when Bb got blocked, and 
  is the amount of credits to pay
for a new bridge. If not, F aborts by returning ? to U. Otherwise,
F randomly picks an available bridge ~Bb, updates U's record with
~; ~Bb; ~b; ~b, where ~ = + ~b b  , ~b = Tcur, ~b = 0, and nally
sends ~Bb to U and (newbridge; Bb) to D, respectively.
 On input (ticket; U) from U, F rst checks whether U has a record in
the user database, his credit balance  satises  > , and his last
time applying for a ticket is at least ! days ago, i.e., Tcur   ! > !.
If not, F aborts by returning ? to U. Otherwise, F updates ! with
Tcur, and then ips a biased coin b to decide whether to grant a ticket
to U: if b = 1, F generates a ticket tk and sends it to U and sends
(ticket) to D; otherwise, F sends ? to U.
3.8.2 Proof
Theorem 1. The protocol  of rBridge securely realizes the ideal function-
ality F of rBridge.
The security proof is based on indistinguishability of the environment Z's
views on the real adversary A and the ideal adversary S. In order to prove
the indistinguishability, we construct an ideal adversary S, which invokes a
copy of the real adversary A that interacts with a \dummy" party and in-
teracts with F and the environment Z in such a way that the probability
distributions of S's outputs and A's outputs are computationally indistin-
guishable.
We dene a series of games between the real world and the ideal world,
Game0,    , Gamen, where Game0 corresponds to the real world and Gamen
corresponds to the ideal world. We dene Pr(Gamei) as the probability that
Z distinguishes between the distribution of outputs of Gamei and that of the
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real world, and jPr(Gamei+1) Pr(Gamei)j denotes the probability that Z
distinguishes between the distribution of outputs in two consecutive games.
By denition, Pr(Game0) = 0. We need prove Pr(Gamen) is negligibly
small. Since
Pr(Gamen) =
n 1X
i=0
Pr(Gamei+1)  Pr(Gamei)

n 1X
i=0
jPr(Gamei+1)  Pr(Gamei)j
it is sucient to prove that each of jPr(Gamei+1) Pr(Gamei)j, i 2 [0; n 1],
is negligibly small.
To prove the theorem, we divide it into several claims according to dierent
scenarios and prove them separately.
When Bridge Distributor Is Corrupt
Claim 1. rBridge is secure against corrupt users under the receiver's pri-
vacy property of the OT protocol, the hiding property of the commitment
scheme, the privacy property of the blind signature scheme, and the zero-
knowledgeness property of the zero-knowledge proof scheme.
Proof. We show by constructing a series of games in such a way that the
environment Z cannot distinguish two consecutive games with non-negligible
probability.
Game0: This game corresponds to the execution of the protocol  in the real
world with a corrupt D and a honest U. Thus, Pr(Game0) = 0.
Game1: This game proceeds as Game0, except that it aborts if A breaks the
OT protocol and learns the bridge chosen by U in OT. Under the receiver's
privacy property of OT, jPr(Game1)   Pr(Game0)j = 1(l), where l is the
security parameter, and 1 is a function whose values are negligibly small.
Game2: This game proceeds as Game1, except that in the execution of
Updating credit balance,  is replaced with a random value 

,
~C is re-
placed with a commitment to (~; x), ~Cu is replaced with a commitment to
(Bu; 

u ;
~u; x
), and 2 is replaced with a simulated proof 9. Since  is calcu-
9Since the proof follows the standard discrete-logarithm-based -protocol, S can sim-
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lated as zs , where s = s
0
+s
00
 and s
0
 is randomly picked by U, the distribu-
tion of  is indistinguishable to D (i.e., A) from that of . Under the hiding
property of the commitment protocol and the zero-knowledgeness property
of the zero-knowledge proof scheme, jPr(Game2)  Pr(Game1) = 2(l).
Game3: This game proceeds as Game2, except that in the execution of
Getting a new bridge, ; b are replaced with random values, ~C is re-
placed with a commitment to (~; x), ~Cb is replaced with a commitment
to ( ~Bb ; ~

b ;
~b ; x
), and 3, 4 are replaced with simulated proofs. Under the
hiding property of the commitment protocol and the zero-knowledgeness of
the zero-knowledge proof, jPr(Game3)  Pr(Game2)j = 3(l).
Game4: This game proceeds as Game3, except that in the execution of Invit-
ing new users, ; !, are replaced with random values, ~C is replaced with
a commitment to (; x), ~C! is replaced with a commitment to (!; x),
and 5 is replaced with a simulated proof. Under the hiding property of
the commitment protocol and the zero-knowledgeness of the zero-knowledge
proof, jPr(Game4)  Pr(Game3)j = 4(l).
Game5 (the ideal world): This game proceeds as Game4 except that the
actual participants are U and S, who interact with each other through F ,
and S has black-box access to A by simulating a dummy user following the
protocol  . In more details, Game5 works as follows.
 Registration: Upon receiving (register; tk; U) from U, F forwards it to
S, who further hands it to A. S receives the verication result b from
A and forwards it to F . In addition, S simulates a dummy user to
perform OT with A, receiving fBi gki=1 and a credential with fBi gki=1
and a randomly picked secret x on it.
 Updating credit balance: Upon receiving (update) from F , S simulates
a dummy user as described in Game2 to interact with Z.
 Getting a new bridge: Upon receiving (newbridge; Bb) from F , S rst
hands Bb to A who replies with b. S then simulates a dummy user as
described in Game3 to interact with Z.
ulate this -protocol in the two standard ways: (1) rewind the adversary (interactive
proof) or (2) use its control over the random oracle (non-interactive proof). To prevent
any rewinding diculties, this protocol should be executed sequentially.
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 Inviting new users: Upon receiving (ticket) from F , S simulates a
dummy user as described in Game4 to interact with Z.
The distribution produced in Game5 is identical to that of Game4, i.e.,
jPr(Game5) Pr(Game4)j = 0. By summation, we have Pr(Game5)  (l),
where (l) = 1(l) + 2(l) + 3(l) + 4(l).
When User Is Corrupt
Claim 2. rBridge is secure against a corrupt bridge distributor under the
collision-resistant property of the hash function, the sender's privacy property
of the OT protocol, the unforgeability property of the blind signature scheme,
and the binding property of the commitment scheme.
Proof. We construct a series of games between the real world and the ideal
world.
Game0: This game corresponds to the execution of the protocol  in the real
world with a corrupt U and a honest D. Thus, Pr(Game0) = 0.
Game1: This game proceeds as Game0, except that the public key PKD of
D is replaced with PKD , which is obtained using the same key generation
algorithm. Since PKD has the same distribution as PKD, jPr(Game1)  
Pr(Game0)j = 0.
Game2: This game proceeds as Game1, except that it aborts if A generates a
valid ticket that has not been given to A without knowing the secret scrtD of
D. The probability thatGame2 aborts is bounded by 1(l) due to the collision-
resistant property of the employed hash function. Therefore, jPr(Game2) 
Pr(Game1)j = 1(l).
Game3: This game proceeds as Game2, except that it aborts if A obtains
more than one bridge in the
 
m
1

-OT protocol. Under the sender's privacy
property of OT, jPr(Game3)  Pr(Game2)j = 2(l).
Game4: This game proceeds as Game3, except that it aborts if A generates a
valid one-time blind signature on a bridge that is not the one received in OT
(e.g., oi on B

i ). Under the unforgeability property of the blind signature,
jPr(Game4)  Pr(Game3)j = 3(l).
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Game5: This game proceeds as Game4, except that it aborts if A nds
another indicator x, s.t., 

x = OWF(x) and 

x 6= x. Since x is uniquely
calculated as zx, jPr(Game5)  Pr(Game4)j = 0.
Game6: This game proceeds as Game5, except that it aborts if any of the
following cases takes place in Registration: (i) (Oi; Bi; i; i; x) is a correct
opening of Ci, but i 6= Tcur or i 6= 0; (ii) (O;; x) is a correct opening
of C, but  6= 0; (iii) (O!; !; x) is a correct opening of C!, but ! 6= Tcur.
Under the binding property of the commitment protocol, jPr(Game6)  
Pr(Game5)j = 4(l).
Game7: This game proceeds as Game6, except that it aborts if A generates
a valid blind signature on a commitment (e.g.,  on C

 or 

u on C

u) in-
dependently of D. Under the unforgeability property of the blind signature,
jPr(Game7)  Pr(Game6)j = 5(l).
Game8: This game proceeds as Game7, except that it aborts if A nds
another indicator ,  2 f; b; !g, s.t.,  = Indic() and  6= . Since
 is uniquely calculated as z
s , where  = (A; e; s), jPr(Game8)  
Pr(Game7)j = 0.
Game9: This game proceeds as Game8, except that it aborts if in Updating
credit balance when (Ou; Bu; u; u; x) is a correct opening of Cu, (O;; x)
is a correct opening of C, ( ~Ou; Bu; u; ~u; x) is a correct opening of ~Cu, and
( ~O; ~; x) is a correct opening of ~C, we have ~u 6= Credit(Tcur   u) or
~ 6=  + ~u   u. Under the binding property of the commitment protocol,
jPr(Game9)  Pr(Game8)j = 6(l).
Game10: This game proceeds as Game9, except that (x;Bu) are extracted
from the zero-knowledge proof 2
10. This fails with negligible probability,
jPr(Game10)  Pr(Game9)j = 7(l).
Game11: This game proceeds asGame10, except that it aborts if the following
condition happens for the proof 3 in Getting a new bridge: (Ob; Bb; b; b; x)
is a correct opening of Cb, (O;; x) is a correct opening of C, and ( ~O; ~; x)
is a correct opening of ~C, but ~b 6= Credit(Tcur   b), ~ 6=  + ~b   b  
 , or ~  0. Under the binding property of the commitment protocol,
10A simulator with black-box access to the adversary can extract the values of hidden
variables in a zero-knowledge proof by rewinding the adversary, as long as the the protocol
is executed sequentially.
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jPr(Game11)  Pr(Game10)j = 8(l).
Game12: This game proceeds asGame11, except that it aborts if the following
condition happens for the proof 4 in Getting a new bridge: ( ~O; ~; x) is a
correct opening of ~C and ( ~Ob; ~Bb; ~b; ~b; x) is a correct opening of ~Cb, but
~b 6= Tcur or ~b 6= 0. Under the binding property of the commitment protocol,
jPr(Game12)  Pr(Game11)j = 9(l).
Game13: This game proceeds as Game12, except that x is extracted from the
zero-knowledge proof 3. This fails with negligible probability, jPr(Game13) 
Pr(Game12)j = 10(l).
Game14: This game proceeds as Game13, except that it aborts if in Inviting
new users when (O;; x) is a correct opening of C, (O!; !; x) is a correct
opening of C!, ( ~O; ~; x) is a correct opening of ~C, and ( ~O!; ~!; x) is a correct
opening of ~C!, we have   , Tcur !  ! or ~! 6= Tcur. Under the binding
property of the commitment protocol, jPr(Game14) Pr(Game13)j = 11(l).
Game15: This game proceeds as Game14, except that x is extracted from the
zero-knowledge proof 5. This fails with negligible probability, jPr(Game15) 
Pr(Game14)j = 12(l).
Game16 (the ideal world): This game proceeds as Game15 except the actual
participants are D and S, who interact with each other through F , and S has
black-box access to A by simulating a dummy bridge distributor following
the protocol  . In more details, Game16 works as follows.
 Registration: Upon receiving tk from A, S sends (register; tk; U) to F ,
and obtains fBigki=1. S then invokes a simulator of OT to interact with
A using fBigki=1 and m   k random values for the rest bridges (such
a simulator always exists for a sender privacy preserving OT scheme).
After that, S simulates a dummy bridge distributor to verify 1 and
provides A a simulated credential. Finally, S stores hU; xi.
 Updating credit balance: Upon receiving k ~Ck ~Cuk2 from A, S rst
extracts (x;Bu) from 2, and locates the owner of this credential (i.e.,
U) by looking up the stored records using x (note that A could use
the credentials of other corrupt users). S then sends (update; Bu; U) to
F . After that, S simulates a dummy distributor with A following the
protocol  .
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 Getting a new bridge: Upon receiving Bb from A, S sends a query
(query; Bb) to F , and forwards the query result (either b or ?) to A.
If A decides to proceed by sending kbk ~Ck3, S extracts x from
3 and uses it to locate U, and then sends (newbridge; Bb; U) to F and
receives ~Bb. After that, S runs a OT simulator to give ~Bb to A, and
nally uses her private key SKD to generate signatures ~b and ~.
 Inviting new users: Upon receiving k!k ~Ck ~C!k5 from A, S nds
U using x that is extracted from 5, and sends (ticket; U) to F , and
nally sends the output received from F (either tk or ?) to A.
The distribution produced in Game16 is identical to that of Game15, i.e.,
jPr(Game16)   Pr(Game15)j = 0. By summation, we have Pr(Game16) 
(l), where (l) =
P12
i=1 i(l).
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CHAPTER 4
A NEW CENSORSHIP CIRCUMVENTION
ARCHITECTURE USING ASYMMETRIC
COMMUNICATION AND IP SPOOFING
In this chapter, we present a new censorship circumvention architecture {
CensorSpoofer [19], which hides the redirection proxy's address from any
user, thus fundamentally resisting to the insider attack, while providing low-
latency censorship circumvention service. Our key insight is that it is feasi-
ble to apply IP spoong to send downstream trac from the proxy to users
while concealing the proxy's IP address, and due to the asymmetric nature of
web browsing trac, we can use a separate low-bandwidth indirect channel
(such as Email or Instant Messaging) with steganography to communicate
the user's messages (e.g., URLs) to the proxy. This asymmetric communi-
cation architecture allows the censorship circumvention system deviate from
need of specially support from the network infrastructure as many existing
systems [16{18] require, and allows ordinary people to set up their circum-
vention systems to help people in censored countries.
We start with introducing the related work on censorship circumvention
systems, and present our system models and design goals. We then describe
the CensorSpoofer framework and give a concrete example of designing a
circumvention system based on this framework. We lastly show the prototype
implementation and evaluation results.
4.1 Related Work on Censorship Circumvention
Systems
In response to Internet censorship, many pragmatic systems such as Dy-
naweb/freegate [8], Ultrasurf [9], Psiphon [10], and Tor [11] have been de-
veloped to help people bypass censorship. All these systems are based on a
simple idea: let the user connect to one of the redirection proxies deployed
outside the censor's network, which can fetch blocked webpages for the user.
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Table 4.1: Comparison of censorship circumvention systems
P1 P2 P3 P4
Redirection proxy based [8{11,13{15,23,40] X X X 7
Infrastructure assisted [16{18] X 7 X X
Email based [28,41] 7 X X X
Anti-censorship content sharing [42{46] X X 7 X
CensorSpoofer [19], rBridge [12] X X X X
P1: Require no special server (By \special server", we mean the number of
such servers on the Internet is much smaller than that of ordinary servers.
An example of special servers is external Email servers that provides
encrypted communication; right now, only Gmail and Hotmail satisfy this
requirement to Chinese users.)
P2: Require no special support from core ISPs
P3: Support low-latency communication, e.g., web browsing
P4: Strong resistance against the insider attack
To hide the nature of the trac, the communications with the proxy are
encrypted. Infranet [47] takes things a step further, embedding the real com-
munication inside a cover web session, using covert channels to communicate
the request and image steganography to return the data. However, while
escaping detection by outsiders, these designs are vulnerable to the insider
attack, where the censor pretends to be an ordinary user to learn the location
of the proxies and then block them.
Several researchers have tried to design better relay distribution strate-
gies [13{15, 23] that aim to identify users who are likely to lead to a relay
being blocked using past history and directing new relay information towards
other users. However, these designs are not likely to withstand a censor who
controls a large number of corrupt users.
TriangleBoy [40] is a circumvention system that is similar in spirit to Tor-
bridge and also uses IP spoong. In TriangleBoy, a user connects to one
of the TriangleBoy proxies run by volunteers, and the proxy forwards the
user's URLs to a SafeWeb server, which fetches the web pages and sends
them back to the user by spoong the source IP address with the proxy's
IP. The only dierence between Tor-bridge and TriangleBoy is that in Tor
the downstream trac takes the same route (through several relays) as the
upstream trac, while in TriangleBoy the server sends the downstream trac
60
to the user directly using IP spoong to improve eciency. Note that, in
spite of using IP spoong, the TriangleBoy proxies are still exposed to users,
which renders the same problem to the insider attack as Tor bridges; whereas,
CensorSpoofer adopts a dierent architecture by using IP spoong to conceal
the proxy's IP address, and hence perfectly resists the insider attack.
Similar to CensorSpoofer, another school of prior research tries to funda-
mentally resist the insider attack, i.e., tolerating any fraction of corrupted
users, by hiding the relay's IP from any user and therefore the censors. One
way to achieve that is to utilize indirect channels, i.e., relaying the trac
sent to/by the relay through one or more intermediate nodes. For example,
MailMyWeb [41] and FOE [28] utilize Email as the indirect channel. For
these systems, users are required to be able to access foreign servers that
support encryption (e.g., Gmail), in order to avoid being detected by the
censor. Nevertheless, considering the Chinese government once temporarily
blocked Gmail [48], we can envision the censor would again block the few
special Email providers, once nding out they are popularly used to bypass
censorship.
It is important to note that, while an indirect channel is also used in Cen-
sorSpoofer, we only use it for sending outbound messages (e.g., URLs), which
are usually very small (especially after encoding URLs into small numbers)
and easy to hide into any indirect channel using steganography. This al-
lows us to obviate the need for special servers (e.g., external Email providers
supporting encryption) to provide a secured and high-bandwidth indirect
channel. Consequently, the cost of blocking the outbound channel of Censor-
Spoofer is signicantly higher: the censor has to block all overseas indirect
communication (e.g., overseas Email and IM) even though the users only use
the local Email and IM providers controlled by the censor.
More recently, researchers proposed several infrastructure-assisted circum-
vention systems, including Telex [17], Decoy routing [16], and Cirripede [18].
Although these systems can support low-latency communication and per-
fectly resist the insider attack, they require a signicant investment of ef-
fort by core Internet ISPs. By contrast, CensorSpoofer is an infrastructure-
independent circumvention system, allowing individuals to deploy their own
anti-censorship systems without requiring any additional support from net-
work infrastructure.
Instead of aiming to provide low-latency communication service, some
61
anti-censorship systems are designed to achieve censorship-resistant content
sharing and/or distribution. For example, some works leverage peer-to-peer
(P2P) networks to provide privacy-preserving le sharing, e.g., Freenet [43],
membership concealing overlay network [44], and darknet [45, 46]. Col-
lage [42] let users stealthily exchange censored information with an external
relay via a website that can host user-generated content (e.g., Flickr) using
steganography.
Table 4.1 summarizes the requirements and capabilities of the representa-
tive censorship-circumvention systems.
4.2 Concept
4.2.1 Threat Model
We consider a state-level adversary (i.e., the censor), who controls the net-
work infrastructure under its jurisdiction. The censor has sophisticated ca-
pabilities of IP ltering, deep packet inspection, and DNS hijacking, and can
potentially monitor, block, alter, and inject trac anywhere within or on the
boarder of its network. However, the censor is motivated to allow citizens
to normally access basic Internet services, such as IM, Email and VoIP, as
blocking such services would lead to economic losses and political pressure.
More specically, we assume the censor is unwilling to interfere with the In-
ternet connections of a user, e.g., an ongoing VoIP conversation, unless it has
evidence that a particular connection is being used for bypassing censorship.
Furthermore, we assume the censor generally allows people to use com-
mon encryption protocols to protect their online privacy, e.g., SRTP [49]
or ZRTP [50] for secure VoIP communication.1 Thus far, this assumption
has held true for most existing cases of Internet censorship, and the use of
encrypted protocols such as SSL/TLS have formed the foundation of most
existing anti-censorship systems [8{11, 16{18, 28, 41]. Once again, blocking
encrypted trac reduces the security of normal citizens using the Internet
for personal or business reasons, and thus censors are motivated to allow
1Although much of VoIP trac is currently unencrypted, the trend is towards more
widespread use of secure VoIP protocols; for example, a number of VoIP software
clients [51{57] and VoIP phones [58,59] have encryption functionality.
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such trac through. There have been important exceptions to this, includ-
ing Iran's blocking of all encrypted trac prior to the 33rd anniversary of
the Islamic Revolution [60] and Egypt's complete disconnection of the Inter-
net in response to nationwide protests [61]. Such drastic censorship requires
fundamentally dierent circumvention approaches that are out of scope of
our work.
We assume the censor can utilize its governmental power to force local IM,
Email, and VoIP providers to censor their users' communication. We also
assume that the censor can block any foreign Internet website or service,
such as an Email or instant messaging provider, if it has reason to believe
that it is being used to circumvent censorship. The censor can rent hosts
outside of its own network, but otherwise has no power to monitor or control
trac outside its borders. Finally, we assume that the censor has sucient
resources to launch successful insider attacks, and thus is aware of the same
details of the circumvention system as are known to ordinary users.
Similar to many existing systems [11,16{18,42,47], our approach requires
that users run specialized circumvention software on their computers. We
assume that users are able to obtain authentic copies of the software without
alerting the government to this fact through some form of out-of-band com-
munication. (We acknowledge, however, that secure and reliable mechanisms
for distributing such software are an important area of future research.)
4.2.2 System Goals
CensorSpoofer aims to achieve the following goals:
Unblockability: The censor should not be able to block CensorSpoofer with-
out incurring unacceptable costs.
Unobservability: The censor should not be able to tell whether a user is
using CensorSpoofer without incurring unacceptable costs.
Perfect resistance to insider attack: The censor should not be able to break
unblockability or unobservability of CensorSpoofer even if nearly all users are
corrupted.
Low latency: CensorSpoofer should be able to fetch and delivery the web
pages for users with low latency. For clarity, CensorSpoofer does not aim to
support highly interactive web applications, such as Javascript.
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Figure 4.1: The CensorSpoofer framework. The user pretends to
communicate with an external dummy host legitimately, and sends URLs
to the spoofer via a low-bandwidth indirect channel (e.g., steganographic
IM/Email). The spoofer fetches blocked webpages according to the received
URLs, and injects censored data into the downstream ow towards the user
by spoong the dummy host's IP.
Deployability: CensorSpoofer should be deployable by people with limited
resources, without requiring any support from network infrastructure.
4.3 CensorSpoofer Framework
4.3.1 Overview
In censored countries, users cannot visit blocked websites directly and have
to connect to some external relays to access these websites. These relays'
IP addresses are exposed to users who connect to them, and therefore can
be easily blocked by the censor who colludes with corrupt users. A natural
solution to this is to employ indirect channels to hide the relay' IP. For
example, MailMyWeb [41] and FOE [28] use Email as the indirect channel
for which the intermediate nodes are Email servers.
To carry voluminous downstream trac (e.g., web content), the indirect
channel must have high bandwidth. This requirement excludes steganographic
indirect channels, such as steganographic IM/Email. As a result, the circum-
vention system has to rely on an encrypted indirect channel so as to utilize
full capacity of the indirect channel while ensuring unobservability of the
transmission of censored data. This requires the intermediate nodes of the
indirect channel to support encryption (e.g., TLS/SSL) and reside outside
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the censor's network (to avoid eavesdropping by corrupt intermediate nodes).
Currently, only a few Email providers can meet this requirement: Gmail,
Hotmail, and Yahoo! Mail. However, due to their limited user base in the
censored country, the censor could simply block them altogether, as witness
when Gmail was blocked in China in 2011 [48].
Our insights. We notice that for web browsing, the outbound trac
(e.g., URLs) is much lighter-weight than the inbound trac. If an indirect
channel is only used to send outbound messages, high bandwidth is no longer
required for the indirect channel. This allows us to use any indirect channel
with steganography to transmit outbound data. Besides, by using steganog-
raphy, users can even use local IM or Email providers that potentially collude
with the censor to access our circumvention system without being detected.
The elimination of requiring special servers to construct the indirect chan-
nel makes it substantially harder for the censor to block our circumvention
system as all overseas Email and IM communication has to be prohibited.
As for the inbound channel, since the relay's IP (i.e., source IP) is not
used in packet routing, we can adopt IP spoong to conceal the relay's IP
address. This eliminates the need for an indirect channel to hide the relay's
IP, allowing us to use direct channels, which are more common and higher-
bandwidth, to send voluminous inbound trac.
Our design. Based on these insights, we design a new circumvention
framework for web browsing, which uses asymmetric communication with
separate inbound/outbound channels. In particular, a user who requires
circumvention service rst starts or pretends to start a legitimate commu-
nication session (e.g., a VoIP call) with a dummy host residing outside the
censor's network, and the relay (called spoofer) injects censored data into the
downstream ow sent to the user by spoong the dummy host's IP, so that
the censor believes the user is legitimately communicating with the dummy
host only. The dummy host does not need to actively cooperate with the
user or the spoofer, but should look legitimate to the censor, e.g., its port
for VoIP should \seem open" if the cover session is a VoIP call. Meanwhile,
the user sends outbound messages containing URLs to the spoofer through
a low-bandwidth indirect channel, such as steganographic IM/Email. An
illustration of the framework is provided in Figure 4.1.
Next, we discuss the upstream and downstream channels in more details.
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4.3.2 Downstream Channel
1) To conceal the spoofer's IP address, we apply IP spoong in the down-
stream ow. Then, the rst question is what kind of trac (TCP or UDP)
is suitable for IP spoong?
Generally, hijacking TCP with IP spoong is dicult. In TCP, end hosts
maintain connection state and acknowledge received data. Suppose the client
has established a TCP connection with the dummy host, and the spoofer
knows the dummy host's IP address and sequence number and tries to inject
packets containing censored data into the downstream ow. First of all, the
TCP connection with the dummy host must be kept alive; otherwise, the
dummy host will send RST packets in response to the client's packets, which
can be easily detected by the censor. In addition, if the spoofer sends more
data to the client than the dummy host (i.e., the sequence number of the
spoofer is higher than that of the dummy host), the censor can detect the
inconsistency of the sequence numbers as long as the dummy host sends any
packet to the client2. Thus, the spoofer has to use the sequence numbers that
have already been used by the dummy host (i.e., injecting packets as \resent
packets"). However, in this case a censor with packet-recording capability
can detect the injected packets by comparing the contents of packets with
the same sequence number.
In contrast, UDP is a connectionless protocol and easier to hijack. Unlike
TCP, end hosts of UDP do not maintain any connection state or acknowledge
received data. Hence, if the dummy host remains \quiet" and the client and
the spoofer cooperate closely by sharing initial information and following a
proper trac pattern, it is feasible to deceive a smart censor into believing
that the client is legitimately communicating with the dummy host over a
duplex UDP channel. In this work, we focus on UDP trac for IP spoong.
We present a concrete example of hijacking UDP in Section 4.4.
2) To ensure unobservability, the communication between the client and
the spoofer (and the dummy host) should look like a normal UDP session
of a legitimate Internet application. So, the second question is what carrier
applications should be used?
UDP is mainly used for time-sensitive applications, such as VoIP, video
2An active censor can check the dummy host's current sequence number by replaying a
client's packet that is outside the dummy host's receiving window; in this case the dummy
host will reply an ACK packet containing its current sequence number.
66
conferencing, multi-player online games, webcam chat, online TV, etc. These
applications usually have high-bandwidth channels. Some other UDP appli-
cations, such as DNS and SNMP, have very limited bandwidth and thus are
not suitable to carry voluminous inbound trac.
We can further divide these applications into two classes based on their
communication manner: (i) client-to-server communication, e.g., multi-players
online games and online TV, and (ii) client-to-client communication, e.g.,
VoIP and video chat. To achieve better robustness to blocking, we prefer
the applications in the second class, since for these applications the pool of
dummy hosts is signicantly larger (e.g., the dummy hosts could be any VoIP
client on the Internet), making it much harder to block them altogether.
3) In CensorSpoofer, we use a dummy host as a cover to stealthily transmit
censored data. The third question is how to select plausible dummy hosts?
The selection of dummy hosts is decided by the carrier application. For
example, if the carrier application is VoIP, then each dummy host should be
a potential VoIP client. Note that an active censor can use port scanning
(e.g., using nmap [62]) to check if a dummy host is actually running the
application, i.e., listening on a particular port (e.g., port 5060 for SIP-based
VoIP). In response, we can use port scanning as well to obtain the list of
dummy hosts. According to our experience, a dummy host is \quiet" (i.e.,
not sending any reply packet) to incoming UDP packets sent to a specic
port, as long as this port is not \closed" on the dummy host. In many
cases, port scanning is unable to determine whether a particular application
is running on a target machine, since the target machine could be behind a
rewall that is congured to lter probe packets. For example, nmap returns
\openjltered" or \closedjltered" when it cannot tell whether the port is
open/closed or the probe is ltered. This ambiguity plays in our favor as it
makes a larger number of hosts appear to be plausible VoIP endpoints.
4) Finally, we note that not all Internet hosts can launch IP spoong.
Some ASes apply ingress and/or egress ltering to limit IP spoong. The
MIT ANA Spoofer project [63] has collected a wide range of IP spoong test
results, showing that over 400 ASes (22%) and 88.7M IPs (15.7%) can be
used to launch IP spoong. Therefore, we need to deploy our spoofer in the
ASes where IP spoong is not prohibited. We can utilize some tools, such as
nmap and the spoong tester developed by the Spoofer project [63], to test
whether a host can perform IP spoong.
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4.3.3 Upstream Channel
To send outbound requests, we use a steganographic channel embedded in
communications such as IM or Email. Note that URLs are typically quite
short and can be easily embedded into a small number of messages. Com-
munication requirements can be further reduced by using a pre-agreed list
of censored URLs and sending just the index of the desired site. Likewise,
navigation within a site can use relative link numbering, requesting, e.g., the
3rd link from the front page of www.cnn.com. Note that steganography re-
quires the use of a secret encoding key to remain invisible; this process can
be made resilient to insider attacks by having each user register a separate
pairwise key when joining the system. Specic steganographic constructions
and their security are beyond the scope of this work. An important challenge
that we must address, however, is the possibility that the censor will perform
blocking based on the recipient's IM identier or Email address; we discuss
a solution in Section 4.4.
4.4 A Design of CensorSpoofer
The CensorSpoofer framework can be instantiated using a number of protocol
choices. In this section, we present a concrete design based on VoIP. We start
with some background about VoIP systems.
4.4.1 Background of SIP-based VoIP
VoIP is an Internet service that transmits Voice over IP-based networks. It
employs session control protocols, such as SIP, MGCP, and H.323, to setup
and tear down calls. SIP is one of the most widely-used VoIP signal protocols,
because of its light weight. In this work, we focus on SIP-based VoIP systems.
SIP is an application layer protocol. It can run on either UDP or TCP.
There are three main elements in SIP systems: user agents, location services,
and servers.
 User agents are the end devices in a SIP network. They originate SIP
requests to establish media session, and send and receive media. A user
agent can be a physical SIP phone or SIP client software running on a
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computer (also called softphone). A user agent needs a SIP ID, which
is signed up at a SIP provider, in order to make and receive SIP calls.
 Location service is a database that contains information about users,
such as SIP IDs, the latest login IP addresses, preferences, etc. Location
services generally do not interact directly with user agents.
 Servers are intermediary devices that are located within the SIP net-
work and assist user agents in session establishment. There are two
main types of SIP servers: registrar and proxy. A registrar receives SIP
registration requests and updates the user agent's information (such as
the login IP address) into the location service. A SIP proxy receives SIP
requests from a user agent or another proxy and forwards the request
to another location.
Here is an example to show how a user (Alice) calls another user (Bob).
Suppose Alice has signed up a SIP ID alice@atlanta.com at the SIP provider
atlanta.com, and Bob got his SIP ID bob@biloxi.com from biloxi.com,
and Alice knows Bob's SIP ID.
When Bob comes online, he rst sends a registration request to the reg-
istrar of biloxi.com with its current IP address. So does Alice to register
herself at the registrar of atlanta.com.
The SIP call initialization process is shown in Figure 4.2. First, Alice
sends an INVITE message (M1), which contains her SIP ID and IP address,
Bob's SIP ID, her supported media codecs, etc., to the proxy of atlanta.com
(note that at this point Alice does not know Bob's IP address). The local
proxy performs a DNS lookup to nd the IP address of the proxy serving
Bob's domain, i.e., biloxi.com, and then forwards the INVITE message
(M2) to the remote proxy. At the meantime, the local proxy sends a Trying
response (M3) back to Alice, indicating that the INVITE has been received
and is being routed to the destination. Upon receiving the INVITE message,
the proxy of biloxi.com sends a query to its location service to look up
the registered IP address of Bob, and then it forwards the INVITE message
(M4) to Bob. The user agent of Bob sends a Ringing response (M6) to the
proxy indicating that Bob's phone is ringed. If Bob decides to answer the
phone, an OK message containing Bob's current IP (M9) is sent towards
Alice; otherwise, a Reject response is returned (not shown in the gure).
From the received OK message, Alice learns Bob's IP address, and sends
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INVITE M1
INVITE M2
INVITE M4Trying M3
Trying M5
Ringing M6
Ringing M7
Ringing M8
OK M9
OK M10
OK M11
ACK M13
Media Session
BYE M15
OK M16
Alice Bobatlanta.com
proxy
biloxi.com
proxy
ACK M12
ACK M14
Figure 4.2: An example of a SIP session (registrars and location services
are not shown).
an ACK message towards Bob (M12, M13, M14). At this point, the SIP
initialization session is done, and Alice and Bob start the media session by
sending each other audio data directly. At the end of the media session,
either party can send a BYE message (M15) to close the call.
The media session uses Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) to transmit
audio data, and Real-time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP) to provide
out-of-band statistic and control information for the RTP ow. Both RTP
and RTCP run on top of UDP. VoIP clients can use SRTP/SRTCP [49]|
an encrypted version of RTP/RTCP|to encrypt their voice communication.
SRTP/SRTCP only requires the user to install a user agent that has encryp-
tion features, and does not require VoIP servers to support encryption. This
implies that the user can use any VoIP provider, including local providers
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that collude with the censor, to access our circumvention system. The en-
cryption key for SRTP/SRTCP can be either established beforehand, e.g.,
via MIKEY [64], or negotiated on the y using ZRTP [50]. In this work, we
consider using pre-established keys for SRTP/ SRTCP.
4.4.2 Censorship Circumvention
A sketch of the circumvention procedure is as follows. The client rst ini-
tializes a SIP session with the spoofer by sending out a normal INVITE
message. Upon receiving the INVITE message, the spoofer randomly selects
a dummy host and replies with a manipulated OK message that looks like
originating from the dummy host. When the OK message arrives, the client
starts to send encrypted RTP/RTCP packets with random content to the
dummy host, and the spoofer starts to send encrypted RTP/RTCP packets
to the client by spoong the dummy host's IP address. Meanwhile, the client
sends URLs through a steganographic IM/Email channel to the spoofer. The
spoofer fetches the webpages, puts them into RTP packet payloads and sends
them to the client. To terminate the circumvention session, the client sends
a termination signal to the spoofer over the outbound channel, and then the
spoofer sends a BYE message (with IP spoong) to the client to close the
call.
Invitation-based Bootstrapping
Since the censor can learn the callee SIP ID from the INVITE message,
the user cannot use a common callee SIP ID to call the spoofer (otherwise,
he/she will be detected once the censor learns the spoofer's SIP ID from
corrupt users). There is a similar issue for the steganographic IM/Email
channel: the censor can detect users sending IMs or Emails to the spoofer
based on the recipient's IM ID or Email address (generally referred to as
upstream ID).
To address this, we let the spoofer use a unique callee SIP ID and a unique
upstream ID to communicate with each client. Hence, the SIP IDs and
upstream IDs of the spoofer learned by corrupt users cannot be used to
detect honest users. To avoid the bottleneck of having the spoofer create a
large number of SIP and upstream IDs by itself, we let each client sign up a
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callee SIP ID and an upstream ID on behalf of the spoofer, and give them
to the spoofer when joining the system. We achieve this by introducing an
invitation-based bootstrapping process.
In particular, if a user Alice wants to join the circumvention system, she
needs an invitation and help from an existing CensorSpoofer user (say Bob).
Alice must trust Bob (e.g., Bob is a friend of Alice); otherwise, Bob could sim-
ply report Alice to the censor for attempting to access circumvention service.
(We note that similar invitation-based bootstrapping strategies have already
been adopted by some real-world circumvention systems, e.g., Psiphon [10].)
First, Alice needs to sign up two SIP IDs and two upstream IDs. One pair
of SIP ID and upstream ID is for herself, and can be obtained from her lo-
cal SIP and IM/Email providers (which potentially collude with the censor).
The other pair is for the spoofer, and must be signed up at abroad SIP and
IM/Email providers (not necessarily supporting encryption). If all external
SIP, IM, or Email providers are blocked by the censor, Alice can ask Bob
to use his already-established circumvention channels to sign up these IDs
for her. Then, Alice encrypts the following registration information with the
spoofer's public key:
caller SIP ID j master key j
callee SIP ID j passwd for callee SIP ID j
upstream ID j passwd for upstream ID
The master secret is used to derive SRTP/SRTCP session keys (and the
key for the steganographic outbound channel if necessary), and the passwords
are for the spoofer to login the callee SIP ID and the upstream ID.
To complete the bootstrapping, Alice needs to deliver the encrypted regis-
tration information to the spoofer. Alice could ask Bob to forward the whole
registration information to the spoofer through his outbound channel. To
reduce the bandwidth consumption of Bob's outbound channel, Alice could
let Bob only forward the encrypted upstream SIP ID and password to the
spoofer; once her outbound channel is established, she can send the rest
registration information to the spoofer by herself.
Note that our unique-ID-assignment strategy cannot be applied to existing
proxy-based circumvention systems, such as Tor, to improve the robustness
against the insider attack. This is because the \ID" in CensorSpoofer is
an application-level ID, and it is fairly easy to get a large number of them;
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whereas, in Tor, the \ID" is the relay's IP address, and IP addresses are
commonly viewed as a scarce resource and it is hard to get a large number
of spare IP addresses.
For the spoofer, it needs to run multiple SIP IDs and multiple upstream
IDs at the same time (possibly with a common service provider). In general,
IM/Email servers and SIP registrars do not limit the number of accounts
registered from a common IP address, because it is possible that multiple
legitimate clients are behind a NAT sharing the same IP address. We did
some tests on two real-world VoIP providers ekiga.net and mixvoip.com
with 100 dierent SIP IDs running on one of our lab machines, respectively. It
turned out for both providers, all these SIP IDs can be registered and receive
calls successfully. We also did tests on Gtalk with 10 dierent accounts on
the same machine and all of them worked properly.
Manipulating the OK Message
Once the bootstrapping is done, the client can initialize a circumvention
session by calling the spoofer using the previously registered callee SIP ID.
In the SIP protocol, the callee's IP address is written into the OK message
(more specically, the enclosed SDP message [65], which is used to negotiate
the session format, such as codecs, ports, IP, etc.), and later is used by the
caller to send RTP/RTCP packets to the callee. Since the OK message can
be eavesdropped by the censor, the spoofer cannot put its real IP into the
OK message.
For this, we use a trick to hide the spoofer's IP address. According to the
IETF standards [65, 66], the SDP messages are not checked by SIP proxies.
This means the spoofer can put the dummy host's IP, instead of its own IP,
into the OK message, without inuencing the OK message being forwarded
back to the client. Since the registered IP of the callee SIP ID (kept by the
location service of the spoofer's VoIP provider) is unknown to the censor,
the manipulated OK message is still plausible to the censor. To verify the
feasibility of replacing the spoofer's IP address in the OK message in prac-
tice, we utilized netfilter queue [67] to modify the OK message on the
y, and tested it with two VoIP providers ekiga.net and mixvoip.com and
an unmodied VoIP softphone PJSUA [54]. We found all manipulated OK
messages were successfully delivered to the client and the client-side soft-
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phone started to send RTP/RTCP packets to the replaced IP address after
receiving the OK message.
Selection of Dummy Hosts
A SIP client listens on TCP and/or UDP port 5060 for SIP signalling, and
the ports for RTP/RTCP are selected randomly on the y (usually RTP
uses an even port and RTCP uses the next higher odd port). To check the
legitimacy of a dummy host, the censor could apply port scanning to test
if the ports used by VoIP are open on the dummy host. In response, we
can also use port scanning to get the list of dummy hosts. As we mentioned
before, in many cases, port scanning can only return an ambiguous result.
For nmap [62] (the state-of-the-art port scanning tool), the possible prob-
ing results include \open", \closed", \ltered", \unltered", \openjltered",
\closedjltered", and \host seems down". Only \closed" can clearly tell the
censor that a particular application is not running on the target machine.
When the status is \host seems down", it is very likely that the target host
is oine. For safety, we also exclude \host seems down" from the acceptable
probing states. Therefore, we let the spoofer periodically run port scan-
ning with randomly selected IPs outside the censor's network to get a list of
acceptable hip; rtp porti (see Algorithm 1).
Another strategy for the censor to check legitimacy of the dummy host is
to compute the AS path of the spoong trac and compare it against the
observed entry point of the inbound trac (i.e., where it enters the censor's
network). If the dummy host is located far from the spoofer, it is likely that
the entry point of the spoong trac is inconsistent with its claimed AS path.
To deal with this, we rst use traceroute to compute the AS path from the
spoofer to the client (called reference AS path), and then choose a dummy
host whose predicted AS path to the client is consistent with the reference AS
path with respect to their entry points. Researchers have proposed several
AS-path inference algorithms with high predication accuracy (such as [68]).
In addition, since the port status on a probed host may change over time,
we let the spoofer keep track of the previously found dummy hosts and
maintain a list of alive dummy hosts. When a circumvention request arrives,
the spoofer picks a dummy host from the alive-host list, and keeps checking
the VoIP ports of this dummy host during the circumvention session. If the
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Input: IP range // outside censored networks
Output: dum hosts
dum hosts fg ;
unaccepted fclosed; host seems downg ;
foreach ip 2 IP range do
if port scan(ip; sip port) =2 unaccepted then
rtp port rand even port() ;
rtcp port rtp port+ 1 ;
if port scan(ip; rtp port) =2 unaccepted and
port scan(ip; rtcp port) =2 unaccepted then
add hip; rtp porti to dum hosts ;
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: Port scanning algorithm to nd a list of candidate dummy
hosts
spoofer detects any port of SIP, RTP and RTCP on the dummy host is closed
before the circumvention session ends, it sends a BYE message to the client
immediately to terminate the SIP session. If the client wants to presume
the circumvention session, it needs to initialize another SIP session with the
spoofer.
Trac Pattern and Bandwidth
To resist trac-pattern-analysis attack, the client and the spoofer should
follow certain patterns of legitimate VoIP trac when sending RTP/RTCP
packets. For VoIP, both RTP and RTCP packets are of the same size and
sent periodically3. The packet size and sending frequency are dened by the
audio codec, which is negotiated during the SIP initialization session. The
codec determines the bandwidth of the inbound channel ( pkt sizefreq).
Some codecs that are used to achieve better voice quality can provide higher
bandwidth (e.g., 64 Kbps with G.711), while others provide lower bandwidth
(e.g., 16 Kbps with iLBC). Note that the same bandwidth is consumed at
the dummy host, due to the dummy trac sent by the client. We can use
some bandwidth estimation tools (e.g., packet-trains [69]) to gure out
3Some softphones have the option of Voice Activity Detection (VAD), which can avoid
unnecessary coding and transmission of silence voice data. With VAD, the RTP packet
size and sending interval may variate. In this work, we assume no VAD is used at the
spoofer or the client for simplicity.
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how much available bandwidth the dummy host has, and based on that, we
choose an appropriate codec to avoid consuming too much bandwidth of the
dummy host.
Packet Loss
UDP does not provide reliable transmission. A RTP packet containing data
of a blocked webpage could be lost during transmission, causing failure of
reconstructing the webpage at the client. To tolerate packet loss, we can use
Forward Error Correction (FEC) codes (e.g., Reed-Solomon code [70]) inside
the inbound channel, so that the client can recover the webpage as long as a
certain number of packets are received.
4.5 Prototype Implementation
4.5.1 The Spoofer
Our spoofer prototype is mainly composed of the following components: a
SIP message handler, a RTP/RTCP transmitter, an outbound message re-
ceiver, and a prefetching proxy.
SIP Message Handler
We use PJSUA v1.12 [54] as an out-of-box tool to register the callee SIP IDs.
We choose PJSUA because we can easily register multiple SIP IDs using the
--config-file option with dierent conguration les. To prevent the user-
agent ngerprinting attack, we use tcpdump to pre-record the OK response
messages generated by dierent softphones, and use them as templates to
generate corresponding OK messages to response to dierent INVITE mes-
sages. In our implementation, we create a prole based on the softphone of
Ekiga [71].
When starting the spoofer, the SIP message handler rst launches PJSUA
to register callee SIP IDs, so that the SIP proxies can forward INVITE mes-
sages related with these SIP IDs to the spoofer. We use netfilter queue [67]
to capture incoming INVITE messages. (Since PJSUA requires to bind port
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5060, we do not create a socket bound to port 5060 to receive INVITE
messages.) For each received INVITE message, the SIP message handler
generates a corresponding OK message, by extracting the session related
information (such as the caller's SIP ID, IP address, tags, etc.) from the
INVITE message and putting them and the IP address of a dummy host into
the pre-recorded OK message. Once the OK message is sent out, the spoofer
creates a thread for the RTP/RTCP transmitter for this client.
RTP/RTCP Transmitter
The RTP/RTCP transmitter needs to send RTP and RTCP packets period-
ically with IP spoong. For this, we use a UDP raw socket, which allows
us to put an arbitrary IP into the source IP eld in the IP header. To en-
crypt RTP/RTCP packets, we use AES-128 of OpenSSL v1.0.0 [72] with a
pre-shared key. Since the sending frequency of RTCP packets is much lower
than that of RTP packets, we only use RTP packets to carry censored data
and send RTCP packets with randomly generated payloads.
To handle packet loss, we implemented a simple XOR-based encoder and
decoder. The RTP/RTCP transmitter partitions the ow of each task (i.e.,
downloading a particular webpage) into xed-sized data blocks (smaller than
the RTP payload), and multiplex the blocks of dierent tasks of the same
client into one stream, which is further divided into groups of size  (e.g.,
 = 10 blocks). For each group, the transmitter generates a redundant block
by XORing all  blocks in the group, so that any  out of the +1 blocks are
sucient to recover the whole group. Whenever a RTP packet needs to be
sent, the transmitter checks if there are any available blocks (including XOR
blocks) in the buer for this client. If so, it writes one block into the RTP
payload and sends it out; otherwise, the RTP packet is stued with random
data.
Note that some blocks may contain data less than their capacity (e.g., the
last block of a task), and blocks may arrive at the client in dierent order
than being sent out; besides, the client should be able to dierentiate blocks
for dierent tasks. To handle these, we use the rst 4 bytes of the RTP
payload to carry a block sequence number (2 bytes), a task number (1 byte),
and block size (1 byte). These elds are encrypted together with the rest
RTP payload.
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Outbound Message Receiver
For this prototype, we use Gtalk as the outbound channel, although our
system in no way depends on encrypted indirect channels like Gtalk. Gtalk
employs XMPP [73] as the transmission protocol. We implemented a simple
Gtalk client using a python API xmpppy [74] to send and receive Gtalk
messages. The Gtalk ID of the spoofer is pre-given to the user. Each Gtalk
message contains a URL, the user's IP address, and a task number (also
contained in the RTP payload). The outbound message receiver forwards the
received Gtalk message to the prefetching proxy by sending a UDP packet,
and then the prefetching proxy will start downloading the webpage according
to the URL.
Prefetching Proxy
For normal web browsing, a user inputs a URL in its web browser, and the
browser will then fetch the html le of the webpage as well as the objects
used by the webpage, such as gures and video clips. The browser downloads
each object by sending a separate HTTP request.
Since each CensorSpoofer client only sends one URL (instead of separate
HTTP requests) to the spoofer, the spoofer needs to prefetch the whole
webpage on the behalf of the client. This means that the spoofer needs to
rst download the html le of the webpage, parse the html le to gure out
the missing objects, and then send separate HTTP requests to fetch these
objects, and nally send all the downloaded data to the client over the RTP
channel.
We built a prefetching proxy (PFP) for this purpose. Instead of imple-
menting a html parser and fetching embedded objects (which are essentially
the operations of a web browser) from scratch, we use an open-source lay-
out engine QtWebKit [75], which is a port of the popular WebKit4 layout
engine into the Qt application development framework. We choose QtWebKit
because it provides a simple QtWebPage type that signicantly reduces our
development eort. Given a URL to load, a QtWebPage performs all the nec-
essary network operations, including parsing, Javascript execution, etc., in
order to render the webpage. The PFP obtains all the raw HTTP responses
4http://www.webkit.org/
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for HTTP requests that the QtWebPage makes. As soon as PFP receives a
full HTTP response, it sends the request-response pair to the client over the
RTP channel. When the QtWebPage nishes loading the entire webpage, the
PFP sends an \End-of-Page" marker to the client, to inform that there will
be no more request-response pair for this webpage.
There are some limitations with our current PFP implementation. The
QtWebPage on the PFP is a distinct browser instance from the client's browser,
so the HTTP requests it generates are likely dierent from what the client's
browser generates. This is a certainty in the presence of cookies because
the cookies of the client's browser and all HTTP request headers are not
forwarded to the PFP. Another limitation is that the current PFP disables
Javascript on the QtWebPage because Javascript execution might generate
additional HTTP requests after the page has \nished" loading (as notied
by the QtWebPage), making it hard for the PFP to determine when to send
the \End-of-Page" marker.
4.5.2 The Client
To avoid the censor detecting CensorSpoofer users based on the ngerprint
of their softphones, we do not implement our own softphone for the clients;
instead, we let the client use any existing softphone to access CensorSpoofer
(i.e., for registration and sending SIP messages). Again, we use PJSUA for
the client prototype without special reasons.
When running the client, PJSUA is rst launched to register the user's SIP
ID. Note that most softphones (including PJSUA) do not support making
calls outside the user interfaces. In order to call the spoofer automatically
inside our client program, we use tcpdump to pre-record the INVITE and
ACK messages, and send them during the ongoing SIP initialization session
with the spoofer (the ACK message needs to be updated according to the
OK message before being sent out).
Once the SIP initialization is done, the client creates a UDP socket to
receive RTP/RTCP packets from the spoofer and send RTP/RTCP packets
to the dummy host. The client uses the pre-shared key to decrypt received
packets and stores the decrypted blocks into a buer. Once a sucient
number of blocks in a group are received, the client uses the XOR-based
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decoder to recover the original group.
We implemented a client-side HTTP proxy (CSP) to handle the HTTP
requests made by the user's browser and the HTTP responses received from
the RTP channel. When the CSP receives the rst HTTP request for a page,
it forwards the URL of the page to the spoofer via the Gtalk channel, but
will not forward subsequent requests for other objects of the page. Instead,
the CSP will \collect" in memory the HTTP request-response pairs received
from the spoofer, and will serve to the client's browser the appropriate HTTP
responses from its memory when the browser makes a HTTP request.
We note that any web browser supporting HTTP proxies, such as Mozilla
Firefox5, can use the CSP because the CSP provides an HTTP proxy com-
pliant interface. Therefore, we do not have to modify existing web browsers
or implement a new one. However, for ease of automating experiments, we
implement a minimal browser application (totalling 150 lines of code) that
is simply a wrapper around QtWebPage to load the webpages. This browser
application also outputs various statistics useful for our evaluation.
4.6 Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of CensorSpoofer in a realistic environment,
and compare it with other circumvention systems. Then, we measure the
selection of dummy hosts.
4.6.1 Performance Evaluation
The spoofer was deployed on an Emulab machine (located in Utah, U.S.),
which has 3.0 GHz 64-bit Duel Core CPU with 1 GB cache and 2 GB of
RAM and runs Ubuntu 11. We deployed 8 clients on Planetlab, which are
all located in China. Since we aim to evaluate the performance of our system,
we let the clients share the same dummy host, which was randomly selected
and located in Illinois, U.S.
To handle packet loss, we made the spoofer add a redundant XOR packet
for every 10 packets. We chose the most commonly used VoIP codecs G.726-
40, G.722-64, G.711, and iLBC, and set the corresponding RTP packet size
5http://www.mozilla.com/refox
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Table 4.2: Bandwidths for dierent VoIP codecs.
Codec
BW of inbound Consumed BW of
channel (Kbps) dummy host (Kbps)
G.711 64 87.2
G.722-64 64 87.2
G.726-40 40 54.7
iLBC 15.6 26.6
and sending interval according to the standard specications in [76]. The
bandwidth provided by each codec and the consumed bandwidth of the
dummy host are provided in Table 4.2.
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Figure 4.3: Time to download the HTML le only.
Each client was congured to repeated download the webpage of wikipedia.
org (which is about 160 KB) for 20 times. For each download, we measured
the downloading time for the entire webpage and the HTML le of the web-
page. (Note that once the HTML le is downloaded, the user's web browser
will display the basic frame and the text of the webpage, and the user can
start reading the text-based content.) We found that the clients were able
to successfully download the page of wikipedia.org (which was blocked in
China) using CensorSpoofer. The results of downloading times are provided
in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4. We can see that with the codec G.711 or G.722-
64, the downloading time for the whole page was 27 seconds, but it only took
about 6 seconds to load the HTML le.
In addition, we compared the performance of CensorSpoofer with that
of existing circumvention systems. We installed a Tor client on one of the
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Figure 4.4: Time to download the full webpage.
0 5 10 15 20 250
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Time to download the html file (sec)
CD
F
 
 
CensorSpoofer (G.711)
Proxy−based
Tor
Figure 4.5: Comparison of downloading time for the HTML le only.
Planetlab nodes, and made it connect to a bridge in U.S. to download the
webpage of wikipedia.org for 50 times. Additionally, we ran the same ex-
periment by making the client connect to a public proxy of NetShade6 (a
proxy-based circumvention & anonymity system), which is located in U.S.
Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 show that it did take longer time for CensorSpoofer
to download the pages than the other two circumvention systems, but the
downloading time for small web contents, such as HTML les, for Censor-
Spoofer is still acceptable.
We note that the performance of CensorSpoofer can be improved by xing
some limitations of our current implementation. For example, our current
6http://www.raynersoftware.com/netshade/
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of downloading time for the full webpage.
prototype of the spoofer does not start sending any packet to the client
until it has fully received a HTML le or an object. We believe removing
these limitations can reduce the downloading time. Similarly, the current
prototype of the client-side proxy does not deliver HTTP data to the client's
web browser until the full HTML le or object is downloaded. The can be
provided by pushing received data to the browser instantly.
In addition, we notice that the main performance bottleneck of Censor-
Spoofer is the RTP channel that carries the voice data. We believe by using
a higher-bandwidth downstream channel, such as video streaming, the per-
formance of CensorSpoofer can be much improved.
4.6.2 Measurement of Dummy-Host Selection
To evaluate the easiness of nding dummy hosts, we implemented the port
scanning algorithm (i.e., Algorithm 1 in Section 4.4) using nmap [62]. We
considered China as the censored country. We randomly selected 10 000 IPs
from the entire IP space, which are located outside China, according to an
IP-geolocation database [77]. We nally found 1213 IPs that can meet our
requirements, and the percentage of satisfactory IPs is 12.1%. This indicates
that there are a potentially large number of usable dummy hosts on the
Internet.
Furthermore, we computed the percentage of appropriate dummy hosts
for a specic client based on their predicted AS paths to the client. We
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Table 4.3: Usable dummy hosts based on AS paths (Spoofer-ASN = 38).
DST-ASN
% of
Entry-ASN
# of usable % of usable
direct IPs dummy hosts dummy hosts
4134 39.4% 4134 225 100%
4837 19.8% 4839 225 100%
9394 8.3% 9394 217 96.4%
4538 7.1% 23911 41 18.2%
implemented a widely used AS path inference algorithm [68] that is based on
AS relationships [78]. We considered the top four ASes in China in terms of
the number of covered direct IPs (according to [79]), and selected a random
IP (i.e., the client) from each of the ASes. We randomly picked 225 dummy
hosts out of the 1213 candidate dummy hosts, and computed the AS paths
between them and the four clients. Then, we compared the output paths with
the AS paths from the spoofer to the clients (computed using traceroute),
and ltered the dummy hosts with inconsistent entry points. The results are
shown in Table 4.3. We can see that for a specic client, there are enough
dummy hosts to use, especially for the clients located in large ASes.
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Figure 4.7: CDF (Note that the CDF plot is truncated to
max len stay usable = 6 hours, since many dummy hosts stay usable for a
very long time).
In addition, we measured the stability of dummy hosts over time. Ideally,
the dummy host should stay \usable" (i.e., none of its VoIP ports becomes
\closed" or \host seems down") during the circumvention session, so that the
user does not need to re-initialize the SIP session to change dummy hosts. To
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Figure 4.8: Stability of dummy hosts over a long period of time.
justify this, we randomly selected 100 dummy hosts out of the 1213 candidate
dummy hosts, kept sending RTP packets to each of them and checking the
states of their VoIP ports. Figure 4.7 depicts the CDF of length of staying
usable for a dummy host. We can see that over 90% dummy hosts can stay
usable for more than 2 hours, and over 80% can stay usable for longer than
6 hours. This means in most cases, the users only need to establish one SIP
session throughout their web browsing.
We also measured the stability of dummy hosts over a longer period of
time. We kept track of the states of 100 randomly selected dummy hosts
from Feb. 9th 2012 to Feb. 16th 2012. To simulate the practical scenario
when the dummy hosts are used by our system to receive VoIP trac, we kept
sending RTP packets to each dummy host periodically, with 1-hour sending
period and 1-hour sleeping period. Figure 4.8 depicts the number of usable
dummy hosts along the time. We can see that the total number of dummy
hosts is almost stable, indicating that the overall pool of candidate dummy
nodes does not shrink over time.
4.7 Security Analysis
We next discuss the security properties of CensorSpoofer against potential
passive and active attacks.
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4.7.1 Geolocation Analysis
Since the callee's SIP ID and IP address contained in the OK message are
transmitted in plaintext, a sophisticated censor could record all the IP ad-
dresses that have been bound to a particular callee SIP ID over time, and try
to discover abnormality based on the geolocations of these IPs. For instance,
a SIP ID would look suspicious if its registered IPs for two closely conducted
SIP sessions are geographically far from each other (e.g., the SIP ID is rst
registered with an IP in U.S. and 1 hour later it is registered again with
another IP in Europe).
To deal with this, instead of picking dummy hosts randomly, the spoofer
can choose a set of dummy hosts, which are geographically close, for a par-
ticular callee SIP ID, according to an IP-geolocation database (such as [77]).
In particular, for the rst-time use of a callee SIP ID, the spoofer randomly
selects a primary dummy host for it, and keeps this information in the user
database. For subsequent SIP sessions calling this SIP ID, the spoofer pref-
erentially assigns its primary dummy host for it. If the port status of the pri-
mary dummy host becomes \closed", the spoofer then preferentially chooses
a dummy host from those that have been assigned to this SIP ID (which are
also stored in the user database). If none of them is available, the spoofer
selects a new dummy host that is geographically close to the primary dummy
host for this SIP ID. (Note that the spoofer should make sure that a par-
ticular dummy host is not being used by two or more callee SIP IDs at the
same time.)
Furthermore, each user can create multiple callee SIP IDs. When a cir-
cumvention session is carried out very close to the previous one, or when the
spoofer cannot nd a suitable dummy host for a callee SIP ID, the user can
choose another callee SIP ID instead.
4.7.2 User Agent & Operating System (OS) Fingerprinting
The SIP protocol denes the basic formats of SIP messages, but allows user
agents (i.e., softphones or SIP phones) to add optional information into the
SIP messages, such as the user's display name, timestamps, and the soft-
ware/hardware information of the user agent. In addition, SIP messages
(e.g., INVITE and OK) contain some random identiers, such as \To tag"
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and \From tag", which are generated by the user agent with self-dened
length. Additionally, the SIP messages also contain the codecs that are sup-
ported by the user agent.
The above information allows a sophisticated censor to ngerprint a par-
ticular user agent. As a result, the censor may detect users communicating
with the spoofer based on the user-agent ngerprint of the spoofer. To ad-
dress this, the spoofer can create a number of user-agent proles based on
the popular SIP phones and softphones, and assign one of them to each callee
SIP ID. For a SIP session calling a particular SIP ID, the spoofer generates
corresponding SIP messages based on the user-agent prole of the SIP ID.
Note that some softphones are only available for certain OSes. For ex-
ample, SFLphone [52] can only be used on Linux, and Blink [51] is only
available for Windows and Mac users. Hence, a sophisticated censor can use
OS ngerprinting tools (e.g., the OS detection of nmap [62]) to check if the
dummy host's OS is consistent with its user agent (learnt from the user-agent
ngerprint). To handle this, the spoofer can also use the OS ngerprinting
tool to detect the dummy host's OS and assign an appropriate user-agent
prole.
4.7.3 Trac Manipulation
The censor can also try to manipulate trac ows in order to detect users
accessing our circumvention system.
In anonymous communication systems (e.g., Tor [11]), an attacker could
use trac analysis to detect if two relays are on the same path of a ow,
by injecting a specic trac pattern at one relay (e.g., by delaying certain
packets) and detecting the same pattern at the other relay [80]. If applying
the same attacking philosophy to CensorSpoofer, the censor could delay the
packets sent by the user, and detect if there are any changes of the trac
pattern in the downstream ow. However, this attack is based on the precon-
dition that the ows sent and received by the remote host are correlated, and
this is not true for VoIP, since each VoIP client sends RTP/RTCP packets
periodically, independent of the incoming ow.
Another way to manipulate trac is to drop packets. Since the spoofer
does not actually receive any RTP/RTCP packets from the user, the censor
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can drop the user's packets without even being noticed by either the spoofer
or the user. The VoIP phones can tolerate a small number of random packet
loss; but if there are no RTP/RTCP packets received for a certain period
of time (e.g., 30 seconds), they will drop the call automatically. Hence, a
censor can adopt the following strategy to detect a CensorSpoofer user: it
blocks all the RTP/RTCP packets sent to the callee, and checks if the callee
still sends packets to the client after a certain period of time. However, the
price of mounting this attack is very high. Since the censor is unable to tell
which ow carries censored data, it has to drop all VoIP ows unselectively,
causing normal VoIP conversations being interrupted.
The censor can also alter, reorder, inject or replay RTP/ RTCP packets
sent to the callee (i.e., the dummy host). However, since a normal VoIP
client running the SRTP protocol can simply lter the invalid packets, such
attacks cannot help the censor detect if the callee is a real SIP client or a
dummy host.
4.7.4 SIP Message Manipulation
The censor can attempt to manipulate SIP messages. For instance, the censor
can manipulate the IP of the callee (i.e., the dummy host) in the OK message,
and then check if there are any RTP/RTCP packets sent to the user. Similar
to the packet-dropping attack, this attack will make legitimate users unable
to make and receive VoIP calls. As we explained in our threat model, we
believe censors are unwilling to mount such intrusive attacks by interrupting
ordinary users' communication.
4.7.5 SIP Probing Attack
Houmansadr et al. [81] recently proposed a SIP probing attack to detect
dummy hosts used in CensorSpoofer from genuine SIP VoIP users. In our
design, we consider that sophisticated censors could use port scanning tools
to check whether the SIP/VoIP ports on a suspected dummy host have le-
gitimate status, and we employ port scanning as well to nd legitimately
looking dummy hosts. Houmansadr et al. found that, besides port scan-
ning, a censor could apply SIP probing to check the status of dummy hosts,
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since a genuine SIP client should reply with a SIP message in response to
a SIP probe message. Because of the SIP probing attack, the percentage of
candidate dummy hosts (which have legitimate status to both port scanning
and SIP probing) in all of the Internet hosts would be much smaller, which
implies that we need to spend more time on probing and testing in order to
nd a usable dummy host. We note that the SIP/VoIP based CensorSpoofer
scheme is just one design instance of the CensorSpoofer architecture. It is
interesting to explore other applications, such as video call, web chat, and
etc., to design censorship circumvention systems based on this asymmetric
communication architecture, and multiple circumvention systems can be po-
tentially used jointly to increase the set of candidate dummy hosts.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
5.1 Summary of Research
Censoring the Internet is a means adopted by many repressive regimes to
control the information that their citizens can access on the Internet. Many
websites that allow people to exchange political ideas (e.g., Facebook, Twit-
ter, and Flickr) or may provide political information contrary to the state's
agenda (e.g., YouTube, Wikipedia, and CNN) have been blocked by the re-
pressive governments [5].
A typical approach to skirting censorship is to deploy circumvention prox-
ies outside the censored network, which can provide indirect access to blocked
websites. However, the redirection proxies are potentially exposed to mali-
cious users and subject to blocking by the censor. In this thesis, we studied
how to protect and/or design censorship circumvention systems against such
insider attacks. We tackled this problem by two approaches: one is to design
security mechanisms to improve robustness of existing censorship circum-
vention systems against the insider attack, and the other is to design new
censorship circumvention systems that can fundamentally resist the insider
attacks.
In particular, we proposed rBridge [12], a user reputation system for Tor
bridge distribution. rBridge addresses two key challenges to bridge distribu-
tion: protecting bridges from being blocked by corrupt users, and preserving
bridge assignment information of each user. rBridge makes use of users' rep-
utation to punish blockers and limit them from repeatedly blocking bridges,
and adopts an introduction-based mechanism to invite new users while re-
sisting Sybil attacks. Our simulation results show that rBridge is able to
provide much stronger protection for bridges than any existing scheme. In
addition, we addressed privacy preservation in rBridge by concealing users'
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bridge assignment information. Such information can be explored to de-
grade users' anonymity in anonymous communication. We designed a novel
privacy-preserving reputation system for bridge distribution using several
cryptographic primitives. To our best knowledge, rBridge is the rst scheme
that is able to perfectly preserve users' privacy in bridge distribution. We im-
plemented a prototype of rBridge, and the experiments showed that rBridge
has reasonable performance.
In addition, we proposed a new censorship circumvention framework {
CensorSpoofer [19], by exploiting the asymmetric nature of web browsing.
CensorSpoofer decouples the upstream and downstream channels, using a
low-bandwidth indirect channel for delivering URLs and a high-bandwidth
direct channel for downloading web content. The upstream channel hides
the requests using steganography within Email/IM, whereas the downstream
channel uses IP spoong to conceal the proxy's real address. Unlike some ex-
isting circumvention systems, CensorSpoofer does not require any additional
support from network infrastructure. We implemented a proof-of-concept
prototype for CensorSpoofer, and the experimental results showed that Cen-
sorSpoofer has reasonable performance for real-world usage.
5.2 Lessons Learned
The rst lesson we learned from the thesis study is that nowadays censors
are not simply relying on cyber techniques to achieve censorship, but are
able to deploy a signicant amount of human resources to help enforcing the
censorship. For instance, according to the study by Zhu et al. [82], on weibo.
com, a Chinese version of twitter.com, keywords blocking is employed as the
basic tool to screen users' posts that contain politics sensitive content, and
besides, there are over 4000 human censors, who manually check the posts
that cannot be unambiguously agged by automatic censorship mechanisms.
In addition, human censors also follow threads on major forum websites
to learn about available censorship tools or redirection proxies in order to
block them. The capability of deploying a large force of human censors
raise a big challenge to designing robust censorship circumvention systems,
because we need to ght against not only censors who have full control of
the local network infrastructure, but also potentially malicious users who are
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indistinguishable from genuine users.
In addition, we learnt that it is not rare to see massive blocking driven by
events, such as crisis. For example, Iran blocked all encrypted trac prior
to the 33rd anniversary of the Islamic Revolution [60] and Egypt completely
disconnected the Internet in response to nationwide protests [61]. It is a
challenging problem to design censorship circumvention systems that can
survive such drastic censorship, and when we evaluate security of certain
anti-censorship systems, it is desirable to measure their robustness under
such event-driven blocking.
Lastly, we have seen a long term arm race between censors and people
in support of anti-censorship. As new censorship circumvention systems are
built and become popular, censors eagerly study them and try to gure out
how to block them. The censors have proved that they are capable of quickly
evolving their censorship weapons using newly developed cyber techniques.
It can be envisioned that such an arm race between censorship and anti-
censorship will continue, and we should be prepared to face more advanced
censorship techniques in the future.
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APPENDIX A
DEALING WITH DUPLICATE BRIDGES
IN THE PRIVACY-PRESERVING
RBRIDGE SCHEME
Suppose U receives a duplicate bridge Bd in the randomized
 
m
1

-OT, which
is identical to one of his existing bridges Be. We allow U to get a new bridge
(by running
 
m
1

-OT again) to replace Bd as long as he can prove that he has
valid signatures for both Bd and Be.
We note that, however, a sophisticated D may try to infer U's bridges by
constructing the list of available bridges used in OT with a single bridge (say
B), and see if later U requests replacement of a duplicate bridge; if yes, D
can be sure that B is one of U's existing bridges. To prevent this, we let D
compute (Cj; Oj) = CMT(Bj) for each available bridge Bj, and publish all
the Cj's; before running
 
m
1

-OT, U randomly picks Cp; Cq, p 6= q, and asks D
to prove that Bp and Bq are dierent. D constructs the following proof:
6 = NIPK
8>>>><>>>>:
(Bp; Op; Bq; Oq) :
(Cp; Op) = CMT(Bp)^
(Cq; Oq) = CMT(Bq)^
Bp 6= Bq
9>>>>=>>>>;
Then, U runs
 
m
1

-OT to get Od; using Od, U is able to open Bd from Cd.
If Bd is duplicate, U constructs the following proof:
7 = NIPK
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(x;Bd; d; d; Cd; Od; d; Be; e; e;
Ce; Oe; e) :
(Cd; Od) = CMT(Bd; d; d; x)^
Verify(PKD; d; Cd) = Accept^
d = Indic(d)^
(Ce; Oe) = CMT(Be; e; e; x)^
Verify(PKD; e; Ce) = Accept^
Bd = Be
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
and sends dk7 to D though an established Tor tunnel.
99
D veries d =2 elistBd and 7, runs
 
m
1

-OT to provide a new bridge ~Bd,
and adds d to elistBd . After receiving Bd, U constructs the proof:
8 = NIPK
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
(x;Bd; d; d; Cd; Od; d; ~Bd; ~d; ~d; ~Od) :
(Cd; Od) = CMT(Bd; d; d; x)^
Verify(PKD; d; Cd) = Accept^
d = Indic(d)^
~d = Tcur ^ ~d = 0^
( ~Cd; ~Od) = CMT( ~Bd; ~d; ~d; x)
9>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>;
and sends ~Cdk8 to D. Note that we include the commitment and signature
of the duplicate bridge Bd in 8 to prevent U from giving this opportunity of
receiving a replacement bridge to another (colluding) user. Finally, D veries
8, signs ~Cd, and sends ~d to U.
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APPENDIX B
CRYPTOGRAPHIC CONSTRUCTION
DETAILS OF THE PRIVACY-PRESERVING
RBRIDGE SCHEME
Let (G1; G2) be a bilinear group pair and Gp be a group of order p where
DDH is intractable with e^ : G1  G2 ! Gp, s.t., e^(P a; Qb) = e^(P;Q)ab, for
all P 2 G1, Q 2 G2, a; b 2 Zp.
B.1 Key Generation
Let g0; g1; g2; g3; g4; g5 be generators of G1, and h be a generator of G2. D
chooses sk
R   Zp as the private key, and computes pk = hsk. Let z denote a
random element in G1. The public key is (g0; g1; g2; g3; g4; g5; z; h;G1; G2; Gp,
e^; pk). In addition, D chooses a random secret scrtD from Z

p to generate
invitation tickets.
B.2 Registration
U rst picks a list of nonces y0j
R   Zp , 1  j  m, computes Y 0j = g
y0j
1 ,
constructs the following proof:
0 = NIPK
(  fy0jgmj=1 :Vm
j=1
h
Y 0j = g
y0j
1
i )
and sends fY 0j gmj=1k0 to D.
D veries 0, and then chooses a pair of one-time keys sk
o R   Zp , pko =
hsk
o
. For each available bridge Bj, D randomly selects e
o
j ; y
00
j
R   Zp , computes
Aoj = (g0g
y00j
1 Y
0
j g
Bj
3 )
1
eo
j
+sko , and tags (Aoj ; e
o
j ; y
00
j ) to Bj.
After OT, U receives fBik(Aoi ; eoi ; y00i )gki=1. For each i 2 [1; k], U computes
soi = y
0
i + y
00
i , and sets 
o
i = (A
o
i ; e
o
i ; s
o
i ). To prove possession of these signa-
tures, U picks r
(1)
i ; r
(2)
i
R   Zp , and computes A(1)i = gr
(1)
i
1 g
r
(2)
i
2 , A
(2)
i = A
o
i g
r
(1)
i
2 ,
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
(1)
i = r
(1)
i e
o
i , 
(2)
i = r
(2)
i e
o
i . To get the initial credential, U sets  = 0 and
! = Tcur, picks s
0
; s
0
!
R   Zp , and computes C = gs
0

1 g
x
2g

3 , C! = g
s0!
1 g
x
2g
!
3 ;
for each i 2 [1; k], U sets i = Tcur; i = 0, picks s0i R   Zp , and computes
Ci = g
s0i
1 g
x
2g
Bi
3 g
i
4 g
i
5 (where s
0
 is the opening to C). Then, U computes the
proof:
1 = NIPK
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(x;; s0; !; s
0
!; fBi; i; i; eoi ; soi ; s0i;
r
(1)
i ; r
(2)
i ; 
(1)
i ; 
(2)
i gki=1) :Vk
i=1

A
(1)
i = g
r
(1)
i
1 g
r
(2)
i
2 ^
(A
(1)
i )
eoi = g

(1)
i
1 g

(2)
i
2 ^
e^(A
(2)
i ;pk
o)
e^(g0;h)
= e^(A
(2)
i ; h)
 eoi e^(g2; y)r
(1)
i
e^(g2; h)

(1)
i e^(g1; h)
soi e^(g3; h)
Bi^
i = Tcur ^ i = 0^
Ci = g
s0i
1 g
x
2g
Bi
3 g
i
4 g
i
5
i
^
C = g
s0
1 g
x
2g

3 ^
x = z
x^
 = 0^
C! = g
s0!
1 g
x
2g
!
3^
! = Tcur
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
and sends xkCkC!kfA(1)i ; A(2)i ; Cigki=1k1 to D.
After verifying 1 and x, D picks e; s
00
; e!; s
00
!
R   Zp , and computes A =
(g0g
s00
1 C)
1
e+sk , A! = (g0g
s00!
1 C!)
1
e!+sk . For each i 2 [1; k], D picks ei; s00i R   Zp ,
and computes Ai = (g0g
s00i
1 Ci)
1
ei+sk . Then D sends (A; e; s
00
)k(A!; e!; s00!)k
f(Ai; ei; s00i )gki=1 to U.
U computes s = s
0
 + s
00
, s! = s
0
! + s
00
!, and si = s
0
i + s
00
i , 1  i  k, and
sets  = (A; e; s), ! = (A!; e!; s!), and i = (Ai; ei; si), 1  i  k.
B.3 Updating Credit Balance
Suppose U wants to update his credit balance with the credits earned from Bu.
U needs to prove possession of u and . For that, U picks r
(1)
u ; r
(2)
u ; r
(1)
 ; r
(2)

R  
Zp , and computes A
(1)
u = g
r
(1)
u
1 g
r
(2)
u
2 , A
(2)
u = Aug
r
(1)
u
2 , 
(1)
u = r
(1)
u eu, 
(2)
u = r
(2)
u eu,
A
(1)
 = g
r
(1)

1 g
r
(2)

2 , A
(2)
 = Ag
r
(1)

2 , 
(1)
 = r
(1)
 e, 
(2)
 = r
(2)
 e. In addition,
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U needs to show that Bu is not blocked by proving that bj 6= zBu for each
bj = z
Bj , where f Bjg mj=1 is the list of blocked bridges.
To update the credential, U calculates ~u = Credit(Tcur   u) and ~ =
+ ~u u; then, he picks ~s0u; ~s0 R   Zp , and computes ~Cu = g~s
0
u
1 g
x
2g
Bu
3 g
u
4 g
~u
5 ,
~C = g
~s0
1 g
x
2g
~
3 . After that, U constructs the following proof:
2 = NIPK
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(x;; C; e; s; s
0
; r
(1)
 ; r
(2)
 ; 
(1)
 ; 
(2)
 ;
Bu; u; u; Cu; eu; su; s
0
u; r
(1)
u ; r
(2)
u ; 
(1)
u ; 
(2)
u ;
~; ~s0; ~u; ~s
0
u) :V m
j=1

bj 6= zBu
^
Cu = g
s0u
1 g
x
2g
Bu
3 g
u
4 g
u
5 ^
A
(1)
u = g
r
(1)
u
1 g
r
(2)
u
2 ^
(A
(1)
u )eu = g

(1)
u
1 g

(2)
u
2 ^
e^(A
(2)
u ;pk)
e^(g0;h)
= e^(A
(2)
u ; h) eu e^(g2; y)r
(1)
u
e^(g2; h)

(1)
u e^(g1; h)
su e^(g2; h)
x
e^(g3; h)
Bu e^(g4; h)
u e^(g5; h)
u^
C = g
s0
1 g
x
2g

3 ^
A
(1)
 = g
r
(1)

1 g
r
(2)

2 ^
(A
(1)
 )
e = g

(1)

1 g

(2)

2 ^
e^(A
(2)
 ;pk)
e^(g0;h)
= e^(A
(2)
 ; h)
 e e^(g2; y)r
(1)

e^(g2; h)

(1)
 e^(g1; h)
s e^(g2; h)
xe^(g3; h)
^
 = z
s^
tu = Tcur   u^h
tu < T0 ^ ~u = 0

_
tu  T0 ^ tu  T1 ^ ~u = (t  T0)

_
tu > T1 ^ ~u = (T1   T0)
i
^
~ =  + ~u   u^
~Cu = g
~s0u
1 g
x
2g
Bu
3 g
u
4 g
~u
5 ^
~C = g
~s0
1 g
x
2g
~
3 ^
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
and sends kA(1) kA(2) kA(1)u kA(2)u k ~Ck ~Cuk2 to D.
D veries 2 and , picks ~e; ~s
00
; ~eu; ~s
00
u
R   Zp , and computes ~A =
(g0g
~s00
1
~C)
1
~e+sk , ~Au = (g0g
~s00u
1
~Cu)
1
~eu+sk . Then D sends ( ~A; ~e; ~s
00
)k( ~Au; ~eu; ~s00u)
to U.
U computes ~s = ~s
0
 + ~s
00
, ~su = ~s
0
u + ~s
00
u, sets ~ = ( ~A; ~e; ~s), ~u =
103
( ~Au; ~eu; ~su), and updates his credential with ~; ~C; ~s
0
; ~;
~u; ~Cu; ~s
0
u, and ~u.
B.4 Getting a New Bridge
Suppose U wants to replace a blocked bridge Bb with a new bridge. U sends
Bb to D through an established Tor tunnel, and D veries Bb is indeed blocked
and then replies with the blocking time b of Bb.
U needs to prove possession of the signatures b and . For this, U picks
r
(1)
b ; r
(2)
b ; r
(1)
 ; r
(2)

R   Zp , and computes A(1)b = gr
(1)
b
1 g
r
(2)
b
2 , A
(2)
b = Abg
r
(1)
b
2 , 
(1)
b =
r
(1)
b eb, 
(2)
b = r
(2)
u eb, A
(1)
 = g
r
(1)

1 g
r
(2)

2 , A
(2)
 = Ag
r
(1)

2 , 
(1)
 = r
(1)
 e, 
(2)
 =
r
(2)
 e.
U can earn ~b = Credit(b   b) credits in total from Bb, and the resulting
credit balance after paying for the new bridge is ~ =  + ~b   b    . U
picks ~s0
R   Zp , computes ~C = g~s
0

1 g
x
2g
~
3 , constructs the following proof:
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3 = NIPK
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(x;; C; e; s; s
0
; r
(1)
 ; r
(2)
 ; 
(1)
 ; 
(2)
 ; b;
b; Cb; eb; sb; s
0
b; r
(1)
b ; r
(2)
b ; 
(1)
b ; 
(2)
b ;
~; ~s0) :
Cb = g
s0b
1 g
x
2g
Bb
3 g
b
4 g
b
5 ^
A
(1)
b = g
r
(1)
b
1 g
r
(2)
b
2 ^
(A
(1)
b )
eb = g

(1)
b
1 g

(2)
b
2 ^
e^(A
(2)
b ;pk)
e^(g0;h)
= e^(A
(2)
b ; h)
 eb e^(g2; y)r
(1)
b
e^(g2; h)

(1)
b e^(g1; h)
sb e^(g2; h)
x
e^(g3; h)
Bb e^(g4; h)
b e^(g5; h)
b^
b = z
sb^
C = g
s0
1 g
x
2g

3 ^
A
(1)
 = g
r
(1)

1 g
r
(2)

2 ^
(A
(1)
 )
e = g

(1)

1 g

(2)

2 ^
e^(A
(2)
 ;pk)
e^(g0;h)
= e^(A
(2)
 ; h)
 e e^(g2; y)r
(1)

e^(g2; h)

(1)
 e^(g1; h)
s e^(g2; h)
xe^(g3; h)
^
 = z
s^
tb = b   b^h
tb < T0 ^ ~b = 0

_
tb  T0 ^ tb  T1 ^ ~b = (tb   T0)

_
tb > T1 ^ ~b = (T1   T0)
i
^
~ =  + ~b   b    ^
~ > 0
~C = g
~s0
1 g
x
2g
~
3 ^
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
and sends kbkA(1) kA(2) kA(1)b kA(2)b k ~Ck3 to D.
D veries 3, b, and . Similar to the OT in the registration, U sends D
a list of nonces, and D chooses a pair of one-time keys to sign each available
bridge using the corresponding nonce. Running OT, U obtains ~Bbk~ob , where
~ob = (
~Aob; ~e
o
b; ~s
o
b).
To update the credential with the new bridge ~Bb, U sets ~b = Tcur and ~b =
0, picks ~s0b
R   Zp , and computes ~Cb = g~s
0
b
1 g
x
2g
~Bb
3 g
~b
4 g
~b
5 . To prove possession
of ~ob , U picks ~r
(1)
b ; ~r
(2)
b
R   Zp , and computes ~A(1)b = g~r
(1)
b
1 g
~r
(2)
b
2 , ~A
(2)
b =
~Aobg
~r
(1)
b
2 ,
~
(1)
b = ~r
(1)
b ~e
o
b,
~
(2)
b = ~r
(2)
b ~e
o
b. Then, U constructs the following proof:
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4 = NIPK
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(x; ~; ~s0; ~Bb; ~b; ~b; ~e
o
b; ~s
o
b; ~s
0
b; ~r
(1)
b ; ~r
(2)
b ;
~
(1)
b ;
~
(2)
b ) :
~C = g
~s0
1 g
x
2g
~
3
~b = Tcur ^ ~b = 0^
~Cb = g
~s0b
1 g
x
2g
~Bb
3 g
~b
4 g
~b
5 ^
~A
(1)
b = g
~r
(1)
b
1 g
~r
(2)
b
2 ^
( ~A
(1)
b )
~eb = g
~
(1)
b
1 g
~
(2)
b
2 ^
e^( ~A
(2)
b ;pk)
e^(g0;h)
= e^( ~A
(2)
b ; h)
 ~eob e^(g2; h)~r
(1)
b
e^(g2; h)
~
(1)
b e^(g1; h)
~sob e^(g3; h)
~Bb
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
and sends ~A
(1)
b k ~A(2)b k ~Cbk4 to D.
D veries 4, picks ~e; ~s
00
; ~eb; ~s
00
b
R   Zp , and computes ~A = (g0g~s
00

1
~C)
1
~e+sk ,
~Ab = (g0g
~s00b
1
~Cb)
1
~eb+sk . Then D sends ( ~A; ~e; ~s
00
)k( ~Ab; ~eb; ~s00b ) to U.
U computes ~s = ~s
0
 + ~s
00
, ~sb = ~s
0
b + ~s
00
b , sets ~ = (
~A; ~e; ~s), ~b =
( ~Ab; ~eb; ~sb), and updates his credential with ~; ~C; ~s
0
; ~;
~b; ~Cb; ~s
0
b, and ~b.
B.5 Inviting New Users
A user U who requests an invitation ticket needs to prove that his credit
balance is higher than the threshold, i.e.,  > , and the last time he
applied for an invitation ticket is at least ! days ago, i.e., Tcur  !  !. In
addition, U needs to prove possession of the signatures  and !. Hence, U
constructs the following proof:
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5 = NIPK
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(x;; C; e; s; s
0
; r
(1)
 ; r
(2)
 ; 
(1)
 ; 
(2)
 ; !;
C!; e!; s!; s
0
!; r
(1)
! ; r
(2)
! ; 
(1)
! ; 
(2)
! ; ~!; ~s0!; ~s
0
) :
C = g
s0
1 g
x
2g

3 ^
A
(1)
 = g
r
(1)

1 g
r
(2)

2 ^
(A
(1)
 )
e = g

(1)

1 g

(2)

2 ^
e^(A
(2)
 ;pk)
e^(g0;h)
= e^(A
(2)
 ; h)
 e e^(g2; y)r
(1)

e^(g2; h)

(1)
 e^(g1; h)
s e^(g2; h)
xe^(g3; h)
^
 = z
s^
C! = g
s0!
1 g
x
2g
!
3^
A
(1)
! = g
r
(1)
!
1 g
r
(2)
!
2 ^
(A
(1)
! )e! = g

(1)
!
1 g

(2)
!
2 ^
e^(A
(2)
! ;pk)
e^(g0;h)
= e^(A
(2)
! ; h) e! e^(g2; y)r
(1)
!
e^(g2; h)

(1)
! e^(g1; h)
s! e^(g2; h)
xe^(g3; h)
!^
! = z
s!^
 > ^
Tcur   ! > !^
~! = Tcur^
~C! = g
~s0!
1 g
x
2g
~!
3^
~C = g
~s0
1 g
x
2g

3
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
and sends k!kA(1) kA(2) kA(1)! kA(2)! k ~Ck ~C!k5 to D.
After verifying 5,  and !, D picks ~e; ~s
00
; ~e!; ~s
00
!
R   Zp , computes ~A =
(g0g
~s00
1
~C)
1
~e+sk , ~A! = (g0g
~s00!
1
~C!)
1
~e!+sk , and sends ( ~A; ~e; ~s
00
)k( ~A!; ~e!; ~s00!) to
U. . Then, D ips a biased coin to decide whether to give an invitation ticket
to U; if so, D generates an one-time ticket tk = fr;HMACscrtD(r)g, where
r R   Zp , and sends it to U.
Regardless of receiving an invitation ticket, U computes ~s = ~s
0
 + ~s
00
,
~s! = ~s
0
! + ~s
00
!, sets ~ = ( ~A; ~e; ~s), ~! = ( ~A!; ~e!; ~s!), and updates his
credential with ~C; ~s
0
; ~;
~!; ~C!; ~s
0
!, and ~!.
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